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WORLDWIDE HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: 
DIMENSIONS AND LEGAL DETERMINANTS 
Dionysia Katelouzou∗ 
In recent years, activist hedge funds have spread from the United 
States to other countries in Europe and Asia, but not as duplicates of the 
American practice.  Rather, there is a considerable diversity in the 
incidence and the nature of activist hedge fund campaigns around the 
world.  What remains unclear, however, is what dictates how commonplace 
and versatile hedge fund activism will be in a particular country.  This 
Article addresses this question by pioneering a new approach to 
understanding the underpinnings and the role of hedge fund activism, 
following activist hedge funds as they select a target company that presents 
high–value opportunities for engagement (entry stage), accumulate a 
nontrivial stake (trading stage), then determine and employ their activist 
strategy (disciplining stage), and finally exit (exit stage).  The Article then 
identifies legal parameters for each activist stage and empirically examines 
why the incidence, objectives, and strategies of activist hedge fund 
campaigns differ across countries.  The analysis is based on 432 activist 
hedge fund campaigns during the period of 2000–2010 across 25 countries.  
The findings suggest that the extent to which legal parameters matter 
depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached.  Mandatory 
disclosure and rights bestowed on shareholders by corporate law are found 
to dictate how commonplace hedge fund activism will be in a particular 
country (entry stage).  Moreover, the examination of the activist ownership 
stakes reveals that ownership disclosure rules have important ramifications 
for the trading stage of an activist campaign.  At the disciplining stage, 
however, there is little support for the conjecture that the activist objectives 
and the employed strategies are a reflection of the shareholder protection 
regime of the country in which the target company is located. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder activism is a long–standing feature of corporate 
governance.  Yet it is only since the 2000s that it has swept through the 
corporate landscape, receiving a big boost from activist hedge funds and 
other shareholder activist funds that are able to influence the conduct of 
corporate affairs with small, non-controlling stakes.1  Hedge funds 
investing in shareholder activism have a history of about two decades:  they 
first appeared in the United States in the aftermath of the “deal decade” of 
the 1980s and moved to the forefront in the mid–2000s before dropping 
significantly during the 2008 financial crisis, but since 2012 they have been 
thriving again.2 
Among the reasons accounting for the flourish of hedge fund activism 
in the years after the financial crisis is the fact that investor cash has flown 
back into the hedge fund sector and activist managers have amassed their 
own cash reserves fueled by rising stock prices and cheap debt.3  As a 
result, activist hedge funds have grown in size and are now more able to 
take significant positions in big companies and pressure for changes in 
business strategy or leadership.4  Characteristically, a columnist 
emphasized in June 2013 that “[n]o company is too large for hedge fund 
activism.”5  Recent targets of activist hedge funds include large American 
 
 1.   The practitioners of this brand of shareholder activism are not a homogenous 
group.  “Activist hedge fund” is a term of art and there are a growing number of investors, 
other than hedge funds, that have emerged prepared to engage in hedge-fund-style 
shareholder activism.  For the purposes of this study, the term activist hedge fund is used as 
a generic one that includes a variety of investment vehicles, which all share a common 
feature:  they build up sizeable stakes in order to influence the conduct of corporate affairs.  
On the nature of this brand of shareholder activism, see infra text with accompanying notes 
22–38. 
 2.   See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Taking Recipes From the Activist Cookbook, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at F10 (citing data from FactSet indicating that about 281 activist 
hedge fund campaigns targeting U.S. companies have been announced in 2014—the greatest 
amount in at least five years). 
 3.   Emily Chasan & Maxwell Murphy, Activist Investors Go Big, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2013, at B6. 
 4.   According to data from HFR Inc., at the end of 2012, U.S. activist funds had $65.5 
billion under management, which is the highest in a decade.  In 2003, they had $11.8 billion.  
Anupreeta Das & Sharon Terlep, Activist Fights Draw More Attention, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324392804578360370704215 
446.  In 2013, the upward trend continued as U.S. activist hedge funds were estimated to 
hold nearly $100 billion in assets under management.  David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, 
Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, 251 N.Y. L.J. 5 
(2014). 
 5.   Jonathan Shapiro, Hedge Funds’ Time Has Come Again, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 7, 
2013, at 23. 
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companies such as Apple, Hess, Procter & Gamble, Air Products, PepsiCo, 
and eBay.6  Recent years have seen some activist hedge fund campaigns 
targeting big companies outside the United States too.  Activist hedge fund 
investor Daniel Loeb’s Third Point accumulated a sizeable stake in Sony 
Corp., the Japanese electronics maker, and pushed for change, while The 
Children’s Investment Fund (“TCI”) took a stake in French aerospace 
company EADS in an attempt to force it to sell its stake in Dassault 
Aviation.7 
In addition, despite first appearing to be unsympathetic to the interests 
of the shareholders as a class, hedge fund activism is increasingly gaining 
in reputation.8  A columnist in The Economist observed similarly that 
activist shareholders have turned “from villains into heroes.”9  At the same 
time, hedge fund activism is getting growing support from large 
institutional investors, many of which are now teaming up with activist 
hedge funds to jointly launch activist campaigns.10  This change in 
institutional investors’ attitudes is driven, at least in part, by the activist 
sector’s robust returns; according to a Citigroup report, activist hedge funds 
have generated nearly 20 percent annual returns since 2009, outperforming 
traditional hedge funds and many markets.11 
Recent evidence addressing the long–standing debate of whether 
activist hedge funds do more harm than good to the target firm and its other 
shareholders has also contributed to the change in how activist hedge funds 
 
 6.   David Benoit, New Push to Throw Assets Overboard, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2014, 
at C1; Ben Fox Rubin, Carl Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2013, at 
B8. 
 7.   Dan McCrum, Activists Keep Fighting Despite Setbacks, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2013, at 12. 
 8.   Compare James Saft, In Praise of Activist Investment, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/us-column-activistinvestors-saft-
idUSBRE97D17I20130814 (explaining the benefits of activist hedge funds), with Andrew 
Willis, Corporate Raiders Now Wearing the White Hat, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 18, 2005, at 
B16 (contending that activist managers no longer greatly affect stock price by just showing 
up). 
 9.   M.B., How Activist Shareholders Turned from Villains into Heroes, ECONOMIST 
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/02/economist-
explains-12. 
 10.   For instance, in November 2012, California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(CalSTRS) cooperated with activist Relational Investors LLC to call for diversified 
manufacturer Timken Co. to split its steel and bearings businesses into separately-traded 
companies, while in August 2011, Canadian pension fund Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 
together with U.S. hedge fund Jana Partners pushed McGraw–Hill to break up.  Randy 
Diamond, CalSTRS Takes Bold Step in Governance, PENSIONS & INVS., Apr. 29, 2013, at 4. 
 11.   See David Gelles, Activism Is Going Global, Citi Warns Clients, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/activism-is-going-
global-citi-warns-clients/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (warning clients that shareholder 
activism has spread globally to all types of companies). 
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are perceived by the investing public and the popular press.  Many 
empirical studies report that activist hedge fund campaigns generate 
abnormal stock returns, particularly around the announcement of the 
activist event, but the evidence is more mixed where longer term operating 
performance of the company is evaluated post hedge fund activism.12  
There is also some recent empirical evidence suggesting that hedge fund 
activism, at least as of 2007, is able to achieve not only its investment 
objective of profiting from shareholder activism, but also provides a form 
of discipline, especially against the agency problems associated with free 
cash flow, and creates improved long–term performance.13  As for the 
alleged “dark–side” of hedge fund activism, empirical evidence suggests 
that “activist hedge funds are not short–term in focus”; they “do not often 
use equity decoupling techniques”; “they seldom seek control”; and, in 
most cases, they “are not mainly hostile to incumbent management.”14 
Taken together, the existing empirical literature coheres with views 
expressed by academic proponents of the promising corporate governance 
role of activist hedge funds.15  Whether activist hedge funds will continue 
 
 12.   See generally Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDS. & 
TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (examining hedge fund activism in the United States between 2001 
and 2006 and analyzing its possible value); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), 
Law Working Paper No. 266/2014) (providing an excellent review of the empirical literature 
on hedge fund activism). For post-crisis hedge fund activism, see CNV Krishnan et al., Top 
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Activism (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 9/2015, 2015) (examining activist hedge fund campaigns in the United 
States between 2008 and mid-2014, and finding that activist hedge funds, especially those 
involved in the largest interventions in terms of aggregate market capitalization, generate 
positive announcement-period abnormal stock price returns). 
 13.   See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long–Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015) (finding improved operating performance of 
companies following activist interventions). 
 14.   Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 460 (2013). 
 15.   JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 248, 272 (2008) (arguing that activist hedge funds together with private equity 
funds are increasingly seen as “the great, shining beacon of hope on an otherwise bleak 
landscape” which can “fill the governance gap created by the passive credit-rating agencies, 
the moribund market for corporate control, the rational ignorance in shareholder voting, and 
the captured directors and self-interested management”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730, 1774 
(2008) (perceiving activist hedge funds as “informed monitors” and describing hedge fund 
activism as “a new middle ground between internal monitoring by large shareholders and 
external monitoring by corporate raiders”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds 
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1047 (2007) 
(hoping that activist “hedge funds may act ‘like real owners’ and provide a check on 
management discretion”); Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a 
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to deliver on their promise to provide more disciplined monitoring of 
management remains to be seen, but there is a growing consensus that 
activist hedge funds are here to stay.  Therefore, understanding the 
underpinnings of hedge fund activism is crucial. 
The ways in which activist hedge funds employ their monitoring 
activities are surely a function of market variables.  For instance, empirical 
evidence shows that the performance, size, and ownership structure of the 
target company are important factors that can influence an activist hedge 
fund campaign.16  An additional market consideration is the market depth—
in other words, the liquidity of shares in the particular market—which 
enables an activist hedge fund to profit by acquiring a significant stake in a 
target firm without a significant price impact.17  Although market factors 
are of critical importance to the emergence and development of an activist 
campaign aimed at a company, the effort required to begin engaging with 
specific companies in any particular country implies that there will need to 
be a generally attractive institutional legal framework before activist hedge 
funds begin their firm–specific research. 
To the best of my knowledge, this Article is the first to systematically 
examine whether “law” is conducive to an activist hedge fund campaign.18  
 
Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324151 (suggesting hedge fund activism may act as a 
corrective mechanism in corporate governance). 
 16.   See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 17.   Previous economic literature shows that deep markets—markets with a fair amount 
of liquidity (non–speculative) trading—facilitate outside investors in concealing their trades 
behind liquidity trading and building up a sizeable share with profit.  See Ernst Maug, Large 
Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade–Off between Liquidity and Control?, 53 J. FIN. 
65 (1998) (finding liquid stock markets increase effectiveness of corporate governance); 
Thomas H. Noe, Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 289, 
308 (2002) (showing that increasing liquidity always increases firm value, even in the case 
of investors with no toehold stake); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 475–76 (1986) (examining pre-
takeover trading by large shareholder and showing that a large shareholder can assemble a 
large block shares only if there is a scope of anonymous trading).  For the impact of firm 
liquidity on mainstream shareholder activism, see Oyvind Norli et al., Liquidity and 
Shareholder Activism, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 486 (2015) (using a hand-collected sample of 
contested proxy solicitations and shareholder proposals as occurrences of shareholder 
activism in the United States and determining that stock liquidity improves shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor management).  But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: 
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) 
(suggesting that liquidity discourages shareholder activism); Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs 
of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993).  In the context of hedge fund 
activism, see Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1754 (finding that target firms exhibit higher 
trading liquidity than comparable firms in their sample). 
 18.   The question of law’s relation to hedge fund activism largely depends on how law 
is defined for the purposes of analysis.  Two important caveats need to be made in this 
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In taking up this challenge, it pioneers a new approach of understanding the 
brand of shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds, 
describing an activist hedge fund’s campaign as a sequence of four stages: 
an activist hedge fund manager first selects a target company that presents 
high-value opportunities for engagement (entry stage); it accumulates a 
nontrivial stake (trading stage); it then determines and employs its activist 
strategy (disciplining stage); and, finally, it exits (exit stage).19  While the 
entry and trading stages will also be present in other forms of value 
investing, the readiness to take a hands-on role and lobby for changes 
(disciplining stage) is the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund 
activism.  Breaking the activist process into a sequence of four stages 
allows for a more fine–grained understanding of the legal factors conducive 
to an activist hedge fund campaign. 
The motivation for this study is the variations of the incidence, nature, 
and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism.  As activist hedge funds 
in the United States were successful in generating above–market rates of 
return for the funds and their investors, they turned to other markets in 
Europe and Asia.  Where activist hedge funds have spread from the United 
States to other markets, they have not emerged as a duplicate of the 
American practice; rather there is considerable diversity in the incidence 
and magnitude of hedge fund activism around the world.  Data that I have 
compiled on instances of shareholder activism by hedge funds and 
similarly structured collective investment vehicles from 2000 through 2010 
in 25 countries—other than the United States—provide a helpful way of 
tracking the emergence of hedge fund activism and testing the implications 
of cross–country legal differences on the incidence and nature of activist 
 
respect.  First, this study only examines the likely impact of corporate and securities laws 
which targeted companies are subject to.  Therefore, laws governing collective investment 
vehicles and their likely impact on hedge fund activism remain out of the scope of this 
study.  Second, the focus is on formal (substantive) law rather than on legal institutions.  
Informal rules, non-legal mechanisms of corporate governance, the company’s own 
constitution, or enforcement actions are also crucial to hedge fund activism’s rise and 
evolution.  Yet, the focus on formal law, and more specifically on shareholder protection 
law and disclosure rules, is an attempt to more clearly define the scope of analysis and 
harness the power of the previously constructed legal indices that are used in the empirical 
analysis of Part IV of this Article. 
 19.   For the third stage of an activist hedge fund campaign, I use the term “disciplining” 
rather than the more common term “monitoring” because effective oversight requires more 
than monitoring incumbent management; it requires doing something about poor 
performance.  See also Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453 (1991) (using the term 
“discipline,” instead of “monitor,” “to refer to the activities, or alternatively the oversight, of 
a sole owner or a large individual owner who is not also a manager”). 
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hedge fund campaigns.  The resulting data are combined with legal indices 
to test which legal rules (if any) matter for hedge fund activism. 
The wider purpose of this Article is, on the one hand, to provide a 
general understanding of the forces that shape the development of 
worldwide hedge fund activism and expand the empirical base for the study 
of the relationship between law and areas of economic and corporate 
governance activity.  On the other hand, this analysis has a normative 
dimension.  Knowing how the worldwide phenomenon of hedge fund 
activism is determined makes it possible to suggest new directions for 
policymakers concerned with the role of law in promoting hedge fund 
activism and shareholder activism more generally.  If, for instance, it were 
found that shareholder rights, such as the nomination and election of 
directors, matter for the effectiveness of hedge fund activism, advocates of 
activist hedge funds would be encouraged to demand empowerment of the 
shareholder rights vis–à–vis the incumbents.  However, increasing 
shareholder power would be desirable only if activist hedge funds could 
operate to improve corporate performance and value.  As previous 
empirical analysis indicates, hedge fund activism does in fact have such 
consequences.20 
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the 
analytical framework for approaching the relationship between law and 
hedge fund activism and introduces an activist hedge fund campaign as a 
sequence of four stages.  Part I also brings the long line of research on the 
relationship between law and economic activity into sharp focus and 
examines how the so-called “leximetric”21 coding techniques can be useful 
in the study of the legal determinants of worldwide hedge fund activism. 
Part II uses the four stages of an activist hedge fund campaign as a 
heuristic to identify the legal factors that are most likely to influence the 
emergence and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism.  In particular, 
Part II suggests that three sets of legal rules, which activist hedge funds’ 
targets are subject to, critically affect the incidence and magnitude of global 
hedge fund activism:  mandatory disclosure rules, ownership disclosure 
rules, and law protecting shareholder rights.  The latter set of rules include 
the legal rules governing the leeway activist hedge funds have to utilize 
shareholder decision–making procedures to influence corporate policy and 
governance, exercise a veto over board initiatives, elect and remove 
directors, and bring shareholder–driven litigation. 
The next two Parts are empirical in nature.  Part III describes the 
sample and presents fresh data on the geography and the insurgents of the 
 
 20.   See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 21.   See infra note 54 and accompanying text (defining “leximetric” and the technique). 
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worldwide hedge fund activism phenomenon.  Part IV empirically 
investigates the implications of cross–country legal differences on 
worldwide activist hedge fund campaigns, drawing upon Part II’s 
theoretical assessments.  The findings suggest that the extent to which 
country–level legal attractions are a determinant of global hedge fund 
activism depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached.  I find 
that at the entry stage of an activist campaign, activist hedge funds tend to 
target companies incorporated in countries with stronger disclosure and 
shareholder regimes.  Moreover, examination of the activist ownership 
stakes reveals that activist hedge funds tend to amass bigger stakes in 
countries with higher ownership thresholds.  The evidence, however, shows 
that other parameters of the ownership disclosure rules—such as the 
breadth of the definition of the stake that triggers the disclosure obligation 
and the deadline within which the investors should report to the competent 
authorities after crossing the relevant threshold—have somewhat weaker 
ramifications for the trading stage of an activist campaign.  Finally, the data 
on the disciplining stage of an activist hedge fund campaign provide little 
indication that the activist objectives and the employed strategies are a 
reflection of the shareholder protection regime of the country in which the 
target company is located.  This might suggest that while a minimum 
protection of minority shareholder rights is a necessary condition for the 
activist hedge funds’ entry to the activist arena, subsequent choices of the 
activist objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to the 
ways in which the legal infrastructure affects hedge fund activism. 
The concluding part summarizes and offers avenues for future 
empirical investigation of the impact of international regulatory differences 
on the incidence and effectiveness of hedge fund activism, and shareholder 
activism more generally. 
I. SETTING THE SCENE 
A. Hedge Fund Activism: A Four-Stage Analytical Framework 
Previous literature identifies several key elements of the brand of 
shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds and illustrates 
how it differs from previous forms of shareholder activism by institutional 
investors, as well from interventions designed to achieve control of the 
targeted companies.  Focusing on activism directed at U.S. companies, 
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have thoughtfully explained 
that “hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante [rather than incidental 
and ex post]:  hedge fund managers first determine whether a company 
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would benefit from activism, then take a position and become active.”22  
Professors Brian Cheffins and John Armour employ the adjectives 
“offensive” and “defensive” to distinguish between shareholder activism by 
conventional institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds and pension funds) 
and shareholder activism by activist hedge funds.23  The key difference 
between these two forms of shareholder activism is the existence (defensive 
activism) or not (offensive activism) of a pre–existing stake in the target 
company. 
However, having an initial endowment in a target company does not 
automatically render activism “defensive” in nature.24  In some exceptional 
cases, activist hedge funds might already have a small shareholding in a 
company before deciding to actively lobby for changes and, thus, hedge 
fund activism is not always “ex ante.”25  Also, the term “offensive” 
activism implies a confrontational posture; whereas many of the activist 
hedge funds are not high–profile activist investors and generally do not 
seek publicity.26 
This suggests that the style of shareholder activism in which hedge 
funds and other shareholder activist funds engage has two defining 
features.  First, it presupposes an equity stake as the departure point which 
is accumulated proactively; that is activist hedge funds either do not have a 
pre–existing stake in the target company or they have a small one which 
they quickly increase when they decide to adopt a hands–on strategy.  
Secondly, it aims to effect change in the policies of the targeted companies 
in order to extract value.  The distinguishing feature of this brand of 
shareholder activism from other forms of engagement with portfolio 
companies lies in its proactive nature:  activist hedge funds initiate changes 
rather than merely reacting to events of underperformance or deficient 
management.  It is also helpful at this stage to distinguish between activist 
interventions and passive acquisitions of shares by otherwise activist funds 
(See Figure 1, below).  The former—hedge fund activism—can be thought 
of as involving a four–pronged strategy approach:  entry, trading, 
 
 22.   Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 1069. 
 23.   Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56 (2011). 
 24.   Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 467. 
 25.   For example, in the TCI’s campaign in J-Power, the Japanese electric power 
company: “TCI . . . changed the purpose of its holding in its filing with the Japanese 
regulator, from one of ‘pure investment’ to an ‘investment to receive a capital return as a 
shareholder and submit important proposals to members of the board or to the annual 
shareholders’ meeting as the situation warrants.” Michiyo Nakamoto, TCI Calls on J–Power 
to Triple Dividend, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at 28. 
 26.   For empirical evidence, see infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text. 
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disciplining, and exit.  The latter involves profitable stock–picking, to 
which value investors aspire, without recourse to a hands–on approach. 
 
Figure 1: The four stages of an activist hedge fund campaign 
 
 
A typical activist hedge fund campaign starts with the selection of a 
target company that presents high–value opportunities for engagement 
(entry stage).  Activist hedge funds search for undervalued and 
underperforming companies.27  Choosing a target company that fails to 
fulfill its potential and thus likely to deliver better shareholder returns is a 
necessary pre–condition for the activist hedge fund’s entry decision.  Yet it 
is not a sufficient one.  Instead, hedge fund activism is intimately linked to 
the ownership structure of the target company.  A dispersed ownership 
structure is more appealing to activist hedge funds at the entry stage of an 
activist campaign, whereas the existence of controlling blocks in the target 
company constitutes a “structural” barrier to shareholder activism by 
activist hedge funds if the controlling shareholders are unwilling to support 
the activist campaign.28  A friendly block-holder in the target company 
aside, it will be more difficult for a hedge fund to pursue an activist 
campaign in a company with shareholders who control a sufficiently large 
block of votes to veto unwelcome activists.  However, the emerging 
patterns of activist hedge fund campaigns in jurisdictions such as Italy, 
France, and Germany, where ownership concentration is substantial even in 
large publicly-listed companies,29 suggest that an activist hedge fund could 
 
 27.   See Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 32 J. 
FIN. ECON. 362, 365 (2009) (finding that about half—47.9% and 45.5%, respectively—of 
the activist events in their sample involved hedge funds recognizing that the target company 
was undervalued and engaging in management to maximize firm value); Brav et al., supra 
note 15, at 1729. 
 28.   See Martin de Sa’Pinto, Laxey–daisical Governance or Saurer Grapes?, 
HEDGEWORLDNEWS, Aug. 30, 2006 (mentioning hedge fund’s ability to accumulate 26% of 
the target’s shares). 
 29.   For a systematic analysis of ownership in Western Europe, see Mara Faccio & 
Entry Trading 
Disciplining Exit 
Exit Entry Trading 
Disciplining Exit 
Exit 
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buy into a company with concentrated ownership structure in certain 
exceptional circumstances.30 
After an activist hedge fund identifies a potential target where it 
anticipates that feasible changes can increase shareholder returns, it starts 
to accumulate its ownership stake (trading stage).31  Activist hedge funds 
usually purchase a sizeable stake in the target company through the open 
market.32  Previous economic literature shows that, in equilibrium, an 
active intervention is only worth the cost when an investor owns a large 
stake.  This is because the gains that he or she can accrue from the increase 
in shareholder returns depend on the size of his or her stake.33  Yet for 
investors with no toehold stake in the firm, such as activist hedge funds, 
shareholder activism is not monotonically related to the size of 
shareholdings.34  Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes 
activist hedge funds intervene even with tiny ownership stakes, while 
empirical studies point out that, although hedge fund activism does not 
 
Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. 
ECON. 365 (2002) (finding that 54% of European firms have only one controlling owner). 
For the ownership structure of East Asian countries, see Stijn Claessens et al., The 
Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 
(2000) (finding that more than two-thirds of the firms in their sample were controlled by a 
single shareholder). 
 30.   See Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership 
Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its 
Evolution, 10 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 328 (2013) (suggesting that activist hedge 
funds invest in companies with concentrated ownership when they are able to take 
advantage of the several different rights provided by the law and company bylaws for the 
protection of minority shareholders, such as the right to elect a director in a company that 
mandates board representation for minority shareholders); see also Cheffins & Armour, 
supra note 23, at 68 (suggesting that another possibility where hedge fund activism is likely 
to be deployed, despite the lack of dispersed ownership, is where there is a special class of 
shares upon which the controlling shareholder’s power is based and the activist lobbies for 
the company to normalize the share structure). 
 31.   For the purpose of simplicity, I assume here that an activist hedge fund has no pre-
existing stake.  Contra supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 32.   For empirical evidence in the United States, see Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. 
Mooradian, Intense Hedge Fund Activists 3, 30 (Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571728 (finding from a total of 272 hedge fund-target 
pairs, only 57 funds purchased any of their shares using a method other than an open market 
purchase, such as private placement or conversion of preferred stock or debt). 
 33.   See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 17, at 468 (arguing that the presence of a 
large shareholder is a necessary condition for the occurrence of value-increasing takeovers); 
Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder 
Intervention, 53 J. FIN. 99, 109–110 (1998) (showing that, in the case of activists with initial 
endowment, larger stakes increase the expected value of the initial shares of the activist and 
the activist’s trading profits and, hence, encourage intervention). 
 34.   Noe, supra note 17, at 303, 308. 
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generally involve controlling blocks, it does involve large minority blocks 
with the median maximum activist blocks being around 10 percent.35 
After accumulating a sizeable stake, an activist hedge fund announces 
a change in the firm’s corporate policy or governance that it believes is 
value-enhancing and then tries to get that change carried out (disciplining 
stage).  An activist hedge fund does not necessarily formulate a set of 
demands for the first time at the disciplining stage; already at the entry 
stage, it identifies valuable improvements in the firm’s policy through 
independent research, while it assesses various firm–specific parameters 
that are likely to influence its entry to a particular target company.  At the 
disciplining stage, however, an activist makes its investment intents known 
to the incumbents either privately via letter writings or meetings, or 
publicly through regulatory filings (e.g. 13D filings in the United States) or 
press reports.  Under this definition, the disciplining stage starts with the 
communication of the activist hedge fund’s demands to the target company, 
followed by the various tactics an activist hedge fund employs in order to 
prod the incumbents to conform to its demands. 
The entry and trading stage will be present in stock-picking too.  But 
the readiness to take a hands–on role and lobby for changes (disciplining 
stage) is the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund activism.  It is also 
noteworthy that even if a hedge fund has an activist reputation, this does 
not mean that it engages actively with all the companies in which it invests.  
Rather, it is possible that activist hedge funds sometimes buy up shares for 
purely investment purposes without prompting any specific changes.36  This 
type of investment is what I term as stock–picking and does not qualify as 
hedge fund activism. 
 
 35.   See Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1747 (reporting that the median initial (maximum) 
percentage stake that a hedge fund takes in the target is 6.3% (9.5%), but finding that hostile 
engagements exhibit larger ownership stakes in target firms); Nicole M. Boyson & Robert 
M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVIATIVES 
RES. 169, 177 (2011) (documenting that the mean initial (maximum) percentage ownership 
by activist hedge funds in target companies is 8.8% (12.4%)); Greenwood & Schor, supra 
note 27, at 362 (reporting a 9.8% average initial ownership in their sample); Katelouzou, 
supra note 14, at 490 (reporting that the median minimum and maximum held by activist 
hedge funds in her sample is 4.9% and 10%, respectively). 
 36.   For example, Atlantic Investment Management, a New York-based hedge fund, 
typically accumulates stocks in undervalued companies, keeps a low profile, and exits at a 
profit.  In egregious times, however, the fund engages in public disputes.  The former 
strategy—stock–picking—includes investments in French Groupe Zodiac, German 
Rheinmetall, and Italian Prysmian, while the latter one—hedge fund activism—involves 
activist campaigns in Japanese Dai Nippon Printing Co and Dutch TNT (data on file with 
the author). 
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Finally, an activist hedge fund exits in order to realize the gains of its 
disciplining activities (exit stage).  Empirical research on hedge fund 
activism targeting U.S. companies by Professors Alon Brav, Jian Wei, 
Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas illustrates that activist hedge funds 
usually exit through selling in the open market.  They found, based on a 
sample of 1,049 hedge fund–target pairs between 2001 and 2006, that 
selling in the open market is the predominant form of activist hedge funds’ 
exit, accounting for two–thirds of all completed cases in their sample, while 
other indicia of exit include the sale, merger or liquidation of the target 
company.37  Lastly, activist hedge funds are not necessarily short–term 
investors; rather in the majority of cases the activist holding periods are in 
the range of one year or longer.38 
B. Theoretical Underpinnings of Law and Economic Activity 
Activist hedge funds invest in specific companies rather than whole 
markets, but the effort required to start engaging with specific companies in 
any particular country implies that there will need to be a generally 
attractive institutional legal framework before activist hedge funds begin 
their firm–specific research.  The idea of a link between systemic legal 
factors and shareholder activism traces back to the 1990s when a number of 
American scholars identified various regulatory obstacles that discourage 
conventional institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual 
funds, from engaging in shareholder activism.39  In the context of hedge–
fund–style activism, Professors Brian Cheffins and John Armour 
investigate potential systemic factors by introducing the idea of a “market 
for corporate influence” in which activist hedge funds are the main 
 
 37.   Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1747–79. 
 38.   See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 479 (reporting that 73.6% of the hedge funds in 
her sample remain in the target company for more than one year). 
 39.   In the United States, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that shareholders face legal barriers in the 
exercise of their voting rights, and taking a more active stance by proposing specific legal 
rules to enhance shareholder empowerment); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity 
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (explaining that a complex web of legal barriers 
and legal risks pose an important impediment to shareholder activism in the United States); 
Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
117 (1988) (discussing some of the barriers U.S. federal securities regulation imposes on 
shareholder action); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control 
of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990) (describing legal barriers which restrict 
financial institutions from holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks 
they do own).  Outside the United States, see Paollo Santella et al., Legal Obstacles to 
Institutional Investor Activism in the EU and in the US, 23 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2012) 
(identifying several legal obstacles to institutional investor activism in the form of voting). 
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practitioners.40  They identify factors that shape the “supply” and “demand” 
side of the market for corporate influence and in so doing they explain the 
past, present and future level of hedge fund activism in the United States.41  
In particular, they suggest that legal rules governing the shareholder rights 
are among the factors that shape the “supply” side of the market for 
corporate influence, while compulsory disclosure and regulation of 
collective investment vehicles have an impact on the “demand” side of this 
market.42 
The idea that law is essential to hedge fund activism and other 
corporate governance arrangements echoes the “law and finance” theme of 
scholarship.  The relationship between law and economic activity has long 
been a subject of considerable debate in economic and legal circles, which 
goes back to Max Weber and Friedrich von Hayek.43  In the 1970s, law and 
society scholars drew on these theories to conclude that there is a causal 
relationship running from law to economic activity impacting national 
developmental policies in developing countries.44  In recent years, a group 
of prominent financial economists produced a burgeoning empirical 
research, known as the “law and finance” literature.45  Professors Raphael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 
were the first to show that a country’s legal tradition determines differences 
in economic outcomes, such as patterns of shareholder ownership and stock 
market development.46  They promulgated a line of greatly influential 
literature, which links various legal rules, such as legal support for 
shareholders’ rights, with numerous spheres of economic and non-
economic activity.47 
 
 40.   Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 61. 
 41.   Id. at 61-75. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 
(1968) (asserting that the “rationality” of law in Western countries—that is, its highly 
differentiated, consciously constructed, general and universal character—helped explain 
why capitalism first arose in Europe); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) 
(suggesting that countries with legal systems based on common law better promote 
economic activity than those with civil law systems). 
 44.   See generally Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? 
Evidence from East Asia, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 829, 831–34 (2000) (providing a review of 
the law and development scholarship). 
 45.   For a review of the law and finance literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008); Mathias 
Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future 
Research, 166 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 120 (2010). 
 46.   Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La 
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). 
 47.   See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003) (constructing 
ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:40 AM 
804 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
The importance of legal institutions for market activity has also been 
underscored by the new institutional economics, from the perspective of 
which adequate and effective protection and enforcement of property rights 
underpin well–functioning markets.48  The quality of enforcement has also 
been a central consideration in the law and finance literature,49 and its 
importance has been emphasized by legal scholars who suggest that the 
impact of the legal system depends not only on substantive rules governing 
investor protection (law on the books), but also on procedural rules and 
regulators’ enforcement capabilities (law in action).50 
Contemporary research on comparative corporate governance also 
embraces the idea that law plays a role in corporate governance—an idea 
that stems from the agency theory.51  Under agency theory, corporate law 
fulfils a functionalist role in constraining the agency costs arising from 
conflicts between the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents).52   
 
an index of the efficiency of court proceedings and finding that procedural formalism in 
dispute resolution is higher in civil law countries than in common law countries); Simeon 
Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002) (examining the regulation 
of entry of start-up companies in 85 countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and 
Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000) (shedding light on payout across 33 
countries and finding that stronger shareholder rights are associated with higher dividend 
payouts).  However, the alleged one-way relation from law (cause) to economic activity 
(effect) promulgated by the law and finance literature was challenged by many legal 
scholars, who provided alternative hypotheses on the institutional determinants of economic 
activity.  See, e.g., CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT 
CORPORATE LAW CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD? (2008) (viewing the relation between law and market activity as a 
dynamic one, referring to the degree of centralization of a legal system, and describing the 
functions that law plays in support of market activity and the political economy of law 
production as reasons why the legal systems differ to each other); Katharina Pistor, Legal 
Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S. (Klaus 
Hopt et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that differences across legal systems largely correspond 
to the differences between liberal and coordinated market economies); Mark Roe, Political 
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 
(2000) (emphasizing the centrality of politics to financial market development). 
 48.   See generally John N. Drobak, Law & the New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Douglass North, Institutions, Ideology, and Economic 
Performance, 11 CATO J. 477 (1991). 
 49.   See, e.g., La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 46, at 1140–45. 
 50.   See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the 
Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of 
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 791 (2003). 
 51.   On the theoretical underpinnings of the “law matters” thesis, see Alessio M. 
Pacces, How Does Corporate Law Matter?: ‘Law and Finance’ and Beyond, in DOES LAW 
MATTER? ON LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Michael Faure and Jan Smits eds., 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260340. 
 52.   This view reflects many dispersed ownership systems, such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States, but it overlooks the role of other stakeholders and is less suitable to 
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Methodological advances, such as legal indices that code legal rules, 
are making it possible to study how, and which, law matters for economic 
outcomes.  The first of these indices—the anti-director rights index—has 
proved provocative in many ways and was widely used as a measure of 
shareholder protection, but at the same time it has been widely criticized 
for coding errors and inacurracies in certain values, to name just but a few 
of its defects.53  Instead, the so-called “leximetric” analysis of legal data 
provides a theoretically and empirically more grounded approach in 
exploring the variation across legal and regulatory regimes of different 
countries and across time.54 
Overall, in the last two decades the effect of law on economic activity 
has been resurged by the law and finance scholarship and has been 
captured—statistically, at least—by legal indices and econometric analysis.  
This testing, by way of quantification, is not limited to law and finance, but 
it can assist other types of corporate governance research.  This topic is 
deferred until Part IV, where legal indices are used to capture whether law 
is facilitative of hedge fund activism and some preliminary empirical 
results are presented and discussed.  But, let us first conceptualize the legal 
settings of hedge fund activism in the next Part. 
 
other legal systems, such as Germany, which deviate from an exclusive focus on 
shareholders.  See Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of 
Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 477 (2003).  
An alternative view is to see the corporation not only as a legal, but also as a social 
institution.  See John Buchanan et al., Empirical Analysis of Legal Institutions and 
Institutional Change: Multiple-Methods Approaches and Their Application to Corporate 
Governance Research, 10 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1 (2014). 
 53.   The anti-director rights index (ADRI) was developed by a group of four financial 
economists and contained six variables (“proxy mail allowed,” “shares not blocked before 
the meeting,” “cumulative voting,” “oppressed minority,” “pre-emptive rights to new 
shares,” and “percentage of share capital to call a special shareholder meeting”) that were 
intended to capture how strongly the legal system of a country favors minority shareholder 
protection against the board of directors and managers.  On the ADRI, see La Porta et al., 
Law & Finance, supra note 46, at 1126–34.  For an overview of the shortcomings of the 
ADRI and a comparison with alternative leximetric indices, see Dionysia Katelouzou, A 
Leximetric Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: The Case of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 9 J. COMP. L. 43 (2015). 
 54.   See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (borrowing the term “leximetrics” from Robert D. 
Cooter and Tom Ginsburg, Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries 
than Others (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE03-012, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520). 
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This Part examines whether and how law is facilitative of hedge fund 
activism.  The analysis provided here does not aim to be a comprehensive 
comparison of corporate law across different jurisdictions.  Instead, it 
draws upon Part I’s four-stage analytical framework of hedge fund activism 
and investigates which legal variables are likely to make a greater 
contribution to the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign.  To 
make this idea compelling, however, particular national corporate laws 
must be addressed.  In the course of the analysis in this Part, therefore, I 
provide examples from different jurisdictions as to how corporate law 
variables are critical for the emergence of hedge fund activism.  Future 
research could extend this analysis into full–fledged comparisons of the 
legal parameters affecting hedge fund activism across different regulatory 
regimes.  Let’s now turn to how corporate law supports the first stage of an 
activist hedge fund campaign. 
A. The Entry Stage: The Role of Mandatory Disclosure 
We have seen above that at the first stage of an activist campaign—the 
entry stage—activist hedge funds need to identify a potential target 
company that presents high value opportunities for engagement.55  In 
selecting a target company, an activist hedge fund must assess what the 
company would be worth following its activist engagement.  This 
assessment requires extensive information on the financial statements and 
governance arrangements of the target company and incurs high costs if the 
information is not made freely available.56  Also, when up–to–date, 
accurate, and relevant information about a potential target is available to 
the market, less unsystematic risk will be involved in the activist’s 
assessment of whether its entry to a company is worth pursuing, and less 
expected gain will be necessary to motivate an activist hedge fund to 
undertake an activist campaign.57 
 
 55.   See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 56.   At the entry stage, an activist hedge fund faces the costs associated with collecting 
information, identifying the potential candidate target, and assessing the value of the target 
company and the risks associated with the activist engagement (search costs).  On the costs 
of an activist hedge fund campaign, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 62–64. 
 57.   Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 120–21 (1999) (making a similar point for the way mandatory 
disclosure influences the potential bidders in the market for corporate control); Merritt B. 
Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 2498, 2547–48 (1997). 
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Mandatory disclosure requirements imposed on publicly-listed 
companies have, therefore, a role to play at the entry stage of an activist 
campaign.  Although information disclosure operates independently of 
activist hedge fund campaigns, financial reporting via annual accounts and 
periodic reports can help the activists’ target selection by providing a 
comprehensive picture of the target’s performance and enabling the 
insurgents to form a better judgment of the value of the firm, its securities, 
and its future prospects.58  For example, mandated forward–looking 
financial information might help an activist to assess the expected return on 
its investment.59  In addition to its impact on the entry stage of an activist 
campaign, periodic financial reporting can also help an activist hedge fund 
in the exercise of its governance powers at the disciplining stage of an 
activist campaign because it enhances the accountability for and the 
transparency of the target company.60 
Mandatory disclosure can also serve to reduce agency losses that arise 
from information asymmetries between insiders (e.g., directors and 
managers) and outside activist hedge funds, as the latter are likely to be 
much less well–informed than the insiders with regard to the operating 
performance or the governance arrangements of the target company, for 
example.61  Suitable tailored disclosure requirements, such as disclosure of 
 
 58.   For a comparison of the mandatory disclosure regimes across six countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), see Gerard Hertig et al., 
Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 281–89 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2009).  Most countries 
also have a set of mandatory disclosure requirements at the initial offering stage.  However, 
for activist hedge funds, initial public offering disclosure is likely to be of minimal 
importance, since they usually buy common stock on the open market and rarely invest in 
initial public offers (IPOs) of securities.  For empirical evidence suggesting that IPOs are 
not a popular method for activists to invest, see Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 32, at 30 
(reporting that activist hedge funds in the United States accumulate common stock through 
IPOs in just 13 out of 457 cases in their sample). 
 59.   Contra Hertig et al., supra note 58, at 284 (suggesting that projective data account 
for only a tiny fraction of mandatory disclosure across jurisdictions). 
 60.   For the dual objective of disclosure rules at the E.U. level (protection of investors 
and protection of shareholders), see THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, 
REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 33-34 (2002). 
 61.   See generally Fox, Required Disclosure, supra note 57, at 118–19; Merritt B. Fox, 
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258 (2009); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1047 (1995) (introducing the “agency cost model” as an alternative efficiency justification 
for mandatory disclosure in securities markets and suggesting that the principal purpose of 
mandatory disclosure is not to enhance price accuracy, but rather to address certain agency 
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate 
managers and shareholders). 
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executive compensation and self–dealing,62 can provide useful benchmarks 
that might help activist hedge funds evaluate potential agency conflicts and 
uncover companies requiring corporate governance improvements. 
Indeed, in the course of their activist campaigns, hedge funds often 
criticize the targets of their activism for poor disclosure practices.  Such 
attempts are usually an adjunct to broader activism focusing on corporate 
governance or capital changes—such as when Pirate Capital, a 
Connecticut–based hedge fund, put pressure on Intrawest to provide more 
thorough disclosures disclosure to investors as part of its broader attempt to 
push for a share buyback,63 or when Elliott Associates L.P. criticized Hess 
Corp. for opaque disclosure, among other corporate governance failures, 
and filed a proxy statement nominating five members to the Hess board.64 
B. The Trading Stage: Ownership Disclosure Rules 
Following the entry stage of an activist campaign, an activist hedge 
fund starts to build its ownership stake.65  In addition to the impact of target 
firm liquidity on the profitability of activist trading,66 rules requiring large 
shareholders to disclose their holdings can further impair the trading 
benefits, and, hence, deter hedge funds from proactive stake–building. 
The focus of this Section is on the impact of four different aspects of 
ownership disclosure on the trading stage of hedge fund activism:  (1) the 
initial triggering threshold percentage for disclosure; (2) the breadth of the 
definition of the stake that triggers the disclosure; (3) the deadline within 
which the activist(s) should report to the competent authorities after 
crossing the relevant threshold; and (4) the scope of the disclosure 
obligation, while it also considers the effect of acting–in–concert 
legislation on the ability of activist hedge funds to amass a sizeable stake. 
 
 62.   See, e.g., Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 158 (Reinier Kraakman et 
al. eds., 2009) (analyzing the differences in disclosure of managerial compensation across 
five countries). 
 63.   Lori McLeod, Intrawest Pushed for Share Buyback: Evaluating Its Options, NAT’L 
POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at 12 (describing how Pirate Capital pressed Intrawest for a share 
buyback). 
 64.   Hess Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 4, 2013) (filed by Elliott Associates, L.P. et 
al.). 
 65.   See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (describing the share acquisition 
process at the trading stage in detail). 
 66.   See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that activists may acquire 
relatively large blocks of liquid shares trading in “deep markets” with little impact on share 
price). 
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1. Initial Ownership Thresholds 
Most jurisdictions now have rules requiring investors to disclose their 
holdings whenever they cross some specified thresholds.  In the United 
States, section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter 
“Exchange Act”) and the related Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) rules require disclosure of transactions that result in anyone 
becoming the beneficial owner of more than 5 percent of a public 
company’s stock.67  In the European Union, the Transparency Directive68 
requires disclosure about major shareholdings where the proportion of 
voting rights reaches, exceeds, or falls below eight triggering thresholds 
ranging between 5 and 75 percent.69  E.U. Member States remain free to 
adopt further thresholds, including lower ones, such as a 3 percent 
threshold in the United Kingdom or a 2 percent threshold in Italy.70 
While enhanced transparency resulting from lower thresholds may 
facilitate the entry stage of an activist hedge fund campaign by giving the 
insurgent a clearer picture of the ownership structure of the target company, 
 
 67.   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1(a) (2015).  Certain types of investors who invest passively 
can instead file a more abbreviated Schedule 13G form.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1(b) (2015).  
In addition, disclosure may also be required under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, while 
all institutional investment managers must report their shareholdings quarterly on Form 13F.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f–1 (2015). 
 68.   Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated 
Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 [hereinafter 
“Transparency Directive”] (amended by Council Directive 2013/50/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 
13). 
 69.   The relevant thresholds are at 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%.  Id. 
art. 9, at 47. 
 70.   It also noteworthy that in several countries, like France and Italy, public companies 
can set lower thresholds for notification of major shareholdings in their own articles of 
association.  The law may specify the lowest threshold, as in France, for example, where it 
can be set at 0.5%. See Commission Report on More Stringent National Measures 
Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in 
Relation to Information about Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a 
Regulated Market, at 26, SEC (2008) 3033 final (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Commission 
Report on Transparency Directive] (citing the French threshold and noting that Belgium 
specifies 1% as the lowest threshold).  In recent years, several E.U. Member States have 
lowered the initial disclosure threshold from 5% to 3% or 2%, generating a policy debate on 
setting a lower initial disclosure threshold at 3% at the E.U. level.  See Commission Staff 
Working Document, The Review of the Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: Emerging 
Issues, at 14 & Annex 8, SEC (2009) 611 (May 27, 2010) (describing the lowering of the 
initial Directive threshold in some E.U. Member States and noting that the European 
Parliament and some experts are in favor of a 3% threshold). 
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lower initial thresholds may act as a brake on the activist’s stake–building.  
When activists buy shares in the open market, the share price of the target 
company increases, but they can hide their presence so that it is profitable 
to them to buy shares.71  However, the possibility of secret trading is 
restricted as there is an upper limit upon which an activist hedge fund must 
declare the amount of shares it owns to comply with ownership disclosure 
rules.72  The maximum size of the ownership stake an activist hedge fund 
can purchase anonymously without disclosure, therefore, puts an upper 
limit to the benefits it can earn from an activist campaign, since the 
activist’s post-disclosure gains must in effect be shared with the market. 
In addition to its negative impact on activist trading, mandatory 
ownership disclosure can serve as an initial warning to the target’s 
management, but may also signal other investors to enter the target 
company.  A relevant high initial threshold enables an activist hedge fund 
to conceal its presence from the incumbents, who may be unable to judge 
whether the activist has voting power in the company.  Adding to its 
limiting impact is the fact that ownership disclosure can also enable the 
target’s management to respond to the activist threat, for example, by 
mounting defensive measures.73  As a result, an activist hedge fund is 
expected to build a stake in a target company as discretely as possible, 
 
 71.   Empirical studies in the United States show that 13D filings by activist hedge funds 
are associated with significant price effects.  See, e.g., April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 
187 (2009) (finding that target share price tends to increase around the date of the initial 
Schedule 13D filing and positive returns continue in the subsequent year for activist hedge 
funds and other private investors). 
 72.   See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 64 (defining the percentage of shares 
owned as an upper limit on the benefits that an activist shareholder may capture and noting 
that the increase in share price that occurs when an activist shareholder’s stake is made 
public is an additional constraint). 
 73.   A recent example is Hologic Inc., a U.S. diagnostics and surgical products maker 
that adopted a one-year shareholder rights plan (exercisable if a person or group acquired 
10% or more of the company’s common stock) after activist investor Carl Icahn unveiled his 
12.63% stake in the firm.  See Joseph Walker & Tess Stynes, Icahn Takes Stake in Hologic, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304337 
404579211802051987232 (detailing Hologic’s decision to adopt a poison pill in response to 
Icahn’s disclosure of his holding).  The potential role of poison pills as a defense against 
shareholder activists in the United States has recently been advanced by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery’s decision to uphold the Sotheby’s poison pill, which was challenged by Daniel 
Loeb’s Third Point.  Third Point LLC v. William F. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 
1922029, at *6–10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/ 
download.aspx?ID=205180 (citing evidence suggesting that Third Point intended to take the 
firm private for authorization of poison pill).  For a discussion of this decision, see John C. 
Coffee, Hedge Fund Activism: New Myths and Old Realities, 251 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2014) 
(theorizing that the poison pill is “losing its blocking power” and recommending the 
shortening of the ten-day reporting window under Section 13(d)). 
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primarily to avoid the burden associated with notification of major 
shareholdings, but also for reasons of anonymity.  For this type of investor, 
the higher the disclosure threshold the better, because a higher threshold 
will increase the proportion of the benefits the potential activist can expect 
to capture if it chooses to amass an ownership stake in a company and 
engage in monitoring activities. 
2. The Definition of the Stake that Triggers Disclosure and “Hidden 
Ownership” 
In addition to the threshold percentage for disclosure, the breadth of 
the definition of the ownership stake that triggers disclosure is likely to 
matter for the trading stage of an activist hedge fund campaign.  Until 
recently, disclosure requirements—in European countries as well as in the 
United States—were triggered by shareholdings carrying voting rights, 
rather than economic positions that do not carry voting rights.  However, 
financial derivatives and other synthetic transactions have increasingly 
enabled investors to separate the economic risk of owning shares of a 
public company from the ability to vote those shares, a phenomenon which 
has been coined as “hidden ownership.”74  In the context of hedge fund 
activism, hidden ownership can be used in order to circumvent disclosure 
requirements and stealthily acquire sizeable ownership stakes without 
alerting the market.  While stake–building through hidden ownership can 
reduce the acquisition costs and increase the amount of benefits that can be 
internalized by an activist hedge fund, it might distort corporate governance 
by keeping the activist’s intents unknown from the incumbents.75 
 
 74.   The concept of hidden (morphable) ownership has been developed by Professors 
Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black in several related articles.  See generally Henry T.C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (establishing the notion of “new vote buying” as 
the decoupling of economic ownership of shares from voting rights); Henry T.C. Hu & 
Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) (expanding upon Hu and Black’s earlier work on 
morphable ownership and promoting a disclosure-based response to related problems). 
 75.   See Eugenio de Nardis & Matteo Tonello, Know Your Shareholders: The Use of 
Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives to Hide Corporate Ownership Interests,  DIRECTOR NOTES: 
THE EUR. SERIES (The Conference Bd., New York, N.Y.), July 2010, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648526 (enumerating various market and corporate governance 
distortive effects of hidden ownership).  But see Soumyadri Chattopadhyaya, The 
Effectiveness of Being Invisible: Hedge Funds, Hidden Ownership and Corporate 
Governance, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 305 (2011) (underscoring the benefits of hidden 
ownership for activist hedge funds and arguing against mandatory disclosure of economic-
only ownership). 
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In response to a debate sparked by publicized cases of undisclosed 
stake–building (not only by activist hedge funds), regulators in several 
European countries have imposed both general disclosure and takeover–
specific disclosure to limit the phenomena of hidden ownership in the last 
several years.76  On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the 13D 
requirements do not seem to directly capture hidden ownership.77  Yet the 
impact on hedge fund activism of any expansion of the disclosure 
requirements to include financial derivatives ultimately depends on the 
incidence of undisclosed activist stake–building.  Although any data are 
surely partial given that hidden ownership is not mandatorily disclosed 
with the exception of some recent regulatory changes, the available 
empirical findings suggest that activist hedge funds do not resort to hidden 
ownership as often as their opponents claim.78  Correspondingly, the impact 
 
 76.   For example, in 2009, the U.K. ownership disclosure rules were amended to 
require investors to disclose all major long positions, in respect of any financial instrument 
(either physical or cash-settled) they hold directly or indirectly, with financial instruments 
being defined broadly to include transferable securities, options, futures, swaps, forward rate 
agreements, and any other derivative contracts.  See FSA HANDBOOK, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2 (2015) 
[hereinafter “U.K. Disclosure and Transparency Rules” or “DTR”] (imposing broad 
disclosure requirements on U.K. listed firms).  France, Germany, and Switzerland have also 
expanded their disclosure regimes to address issues arising from hidden ownership.  See 
generally Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled 
Equity Derivatives: An Intentions-Based Approach, 2 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 227, 238 
(2012) (calling the United Kingdom a “forerunner[] in preventing [cash-settled equity 
derivative] abuse” and noting that France, Germany, and Switzerland have followed suit). 
 77.   Rule 13d-3(a) of the Exchange Act provides that a beneficial owner is any person 
who directly or indirectly has voting power or investment power over the security, while 
beneficial ownership of shares also includes “the right to acquire beneficial ownership . . . 
within sixty days, including . . . [t]hrough the exercise of any option [or] warrant.”  17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a), (d)(1)(i) (2014). 
   It is also noteworthy that the litigation battle arising in 2008 between the CSX 
Corporation and two activist hedge funds, The Children’s Investment Fund Management 
(TCI) and 3G Capital Partners, gave no clear answer regarding the disclosure requirements 
of hidden ownership.  The two activist hedge funds circumvented the disclosure 
requirements under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act through cash-settled total return 
equity swaps and sought to wage a proxy contest over the U.S. railroad company.  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit did not reach any agreement concerning whether and under what 
circumstances the long party to a cash-settled total return swap will be deemed to 
beneficially own shares for the purposes of Section 13(d).  See CSX Corp. v. The Children’s 
Inv. Fund Mgmt., 654 F.3d 276, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2011) (identifying the disagreement 
regarding beneficial ownership and limiting the majority opinion to the issue of group 
formation).  However, Judge Winter, in a lengthy concurring opinion, discussed this issue in 
some depth.  His view was that, without an agreement between the long and short parties 
permitting the long party to acquire or vote the counterparty’s hedge position, cash-settled 
total return swaps do not render the long party a beneficial owner with a potential disclosure 
obligation under Section 13(d).  Id. at 288–89 (Winter, J. concurring). 
 78.   See Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling, supra note 74, at 659–81 (studying 
42 known or rumored instances of hidden ownership worldwide, though not necessarily as a 
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of an extended disclosure regime catching economic ownership on hedge 
fund activism is unlikely to be dramatic. 
3. Time Window of Disclosure Obligations 
The deadline within which the investors should report to the 
competent authorities after crossing the ownership thresholds for 
notification might also affect the profitability of activist trading.79  As the 
reporting deadline becomes more stringent, there is less scope for secret 
trading and, in turn, it is more costly for activist hedge funds to accumulate 
a sizeable stake.  If an activist is forced to disclose its shareholding in the 
target too soon, its toehold and its ensuing profit will be smaller and hedge 
fund activity will be consequently reduced.  In addition, a short time 
window for ownership disclosure may serve to increase the time available 
to the incumbents to prepare the defensive steps permitted. 
Indeed, empirical evidence on both sides of the Atlantic confirms that 
activist hedge funds often hide their investments as long as possible.  A 
 
part of an activist hedge funds campaign); Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 498 (collecting data 
on the publicly-reported instances of decoupling of economic and voting ownership outside 
the United States and reporting that activist hedge funds have used hidden ownership 
techniques to enforce their activist role in 13 out of 432 activist campaigns studied). 
 79.   In the United States, the 13D Schedule must be filed within 10 days of passing the 
5% holding.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014).  Since 2010, corporate directors and their 
advocates have lobbied the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to shorten the 
disclosure time-window from ten days to only one, aiming at shrinking the share blocks that 
activist investors can acquire.  See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (requesting that the SEC shall “propose 
amendments to shorten the reporting deadline and expand the definition of beneficial 
ownership under the reporting rules”).  However, the SEC has yet to take action on this 
matter.  See Liz Hoffman, SEC Unlikely to Touch 13(D) Stock-Buying Window, WALL ST. J. 
MONEYBEAT (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/10/02/sec-
unlikely-to-touch-13d-stock-buying-window/ (reporting that SEC Commissioner Daniel 
Gallagher said the “agency is unlikely to move anytime soon to tighten” the disclosure time 
window). 
   In the European Union, the Transparency Directive sets a stricter deadline, as the acquirer 
should notify the issuer as soon as possible after reaching the threshold, but no later than 
four days.  Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 12, § 2, at 48.  The Transparency 
Directive also imposes a subsequent time window of three trading days within which the 
target company must announce the acquisition to the public.  Id. at art. 12, § 6, at 48.  
Several E.U. Member States have imposed even shorter deadlines for investors’ 
announcement on major holdings.  For example, in the United Kingdom, U.K. acquirers 
shall be disclosed to the company and the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) within 
no later than two trading days.  See DTR, supra note 76, § 5.8.3 (setting the deadline for 
non-U.K. issuers at four trading days and the deadline for all other issuers at two trading 
days). 
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recent study of Schedule 13D filings by activist hedge funds between 1994 
and 2007 in the United States found that it is common for activist hedge 
funds to use the opportunity not to disclose immediately upon crossing the 
5% threshold.80  However, the same study did not find evidence that 
activists who make full use of the ten–day period prior to disclosure 
accumulate larger stakes than those who disclose more quickly after 
crossing the 5% threshold.81  A study on hedge fund activism in Germany 
similarly reports that activist hedge funds intentionally delay notifications 
in order to facilitate further acquisitions of ownership stakes.82  However, 
the authors of this study pointed out that the market reaction is not different 
for timely and delayed disclosures and suggested that the disclosure per se 
is more important than the time window of disclosure.83 
4. Intentions–Related Disclosure 
Another aspect of the mandatory ownership disclosure regime that 
might affect the trading stage of an activist campaign is whether or not the 
activist hedge fund should disclose its intentions when it reports its 
holdings.  In the United States, investors acquiring more than 5 percent of 
any class of securities of a publicly–listed company must file with the SEC 
if they have an interest in influencing the management of the company, 
with the underlying purpose being to alert other shareholders to a potential 
change of control.84  In the European Union, the Transparency Directive is 
silent on this issue.85  However, some E.U. Member States impose 
 
 80.   Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: 
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 10–11 (2013) (reporting that in over 40% of the 
public disclosures studied activist hedge funds take advantage of the ten-day window, with 
nearly 20% filing on the tenth day). 
 81.   Id. at 12. 
 82.   Peter Weber & Heinz Zimmermann, Hedge Fund Activism and Information 
Disclosure: The Case of Germany, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 1017 (2013) (suggesting that the 
small risk of getting fined for delayed announcement and the low fines that must be paid 
upon conviction may explain the violation of disclosure procedures). 
 83.   Id. at 1048. 
 84.   17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2015).  In particular, Item 4 of Schedule 13D requires 
the filer to disclose any “plans or proposals” he/she has with respect to the target issuer, 
which may or will result in, among others, a change in the board of directors, a liquidation, a 
merger, a sale of material assets of the issuer, a change of the issuer’s corporate or business 
structure, or a change of the issuer’s charter or bylaws.  Id. 
 85.   On the content of the disclosure, see Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 12, 
§ 1, at 48 (identifying four categories of disclosure information); see also Roberta S. 
Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 379, 
393–98 (2005) (comparing the disclosure regimes of the E.U. to the U.S. regime). 
ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:40 AM 
2015] WORLDWIDE HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 815 
 
additional disclosure obligations for large investors in relation to the 
objectives pursued by their investment.86 
The extended information duties resulting from intentions–related 
disclosure could discourage the brand of shareholder activism associated 
with activist hedge funds, since the activist’s underlying strategy at the 
trading stage focuses on the acquisition of a toehold shareholding in the 
target company.  The activist can manage this toehold without revealing the 
object of its intended campaign.  The counterargument might be that if an 
investor with an activist reputation accumulates a sizeable stake in a 
company and this is disclosed, everyone knows what is going on without a 
declaration of intent.  In addition, intentions–related disclosure obligations 
may not always be counterproductive for activist hedge funds.  Activist 
campaigns need publicity:  activist hedge funds often make their agenda 
public via press releases and engage in a public dialogue with the 
incumbent directors, which not only puts further pressure on the target 
company but also influences other shareholders.  Correspondingly, an 
intentions–related disclosure may offer activists the publicity they need in 
order to profit from their monitoring activities.  Some studies have also 
shown that the investment purpose may strongly influence the targets’ 
stock price reaction,87 and without intentions–related disclosure it might be 
 
 86.   For example, in France any investor crossing the 10% or 20% threshold of capital 
or voting rights must declare the objectives to be pursued in the next 12 months, declaring, 
among others, whether he/she is acting alone or jointly and whether he/she envisages 
making further acquisitions or acquiring a controlling interest in the company.  See Code 
Commerce [C. Com.] art. L. 233–7 VII c (Fr.) (mandating intentions-related reporting in 
France). 
   Germany has also recently adopted a new law (the so-called Risk Limitation Act) 
according to which investors exceeding the 10% threshold are required to disclose their 
objectives.  Investors are, in particular, requested to disclose whether the acquisition is for 
the purpose of implementing strategic objectives or achieving trading profits, whether they 
intend to acquire further voting rights in the following 12 months, whether they intend to 
exercise any influence, or whether they seek a material change in the capital structure or 
dividend policy of the company.  See generally Commission Report on Transparency 
Directive, supra note 70, at 28 (identifying the German legislation and similar French 
disclosure obligations). 
   Some jurisdictions employ a further technique and permit the company to trigger a 
disclosure obligation in relation to the intentions of the beneficial owners.  See, e.g., 
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Part 22 (U.K.) (permitting public U.K. companies to request 
intentions-related disclosures from shareholders who are interested in the company’s shares 
or were interested in the company’s shares at any time within three years prior to the 
request). 
 87.   See Klein & Zur, supra note 71, at 209-11 (finding that the market reacts more 
favorably when the activist hedge fund seeks board representation, buys more stock with the 
intention of buying the whole firm, or expresses concern over the corporate governance 
practices of the target company). 
ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:40 AM 
816 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
more difficult for the market to assess the value of an activist hedge fund 
campaign.88 
5. Acting–in–Concert Legislation 
In addition to ownership disclosure rules, tight rules on acting–in–
concert may introduce an important barrier to the trading stage of an 
activist campaign.  An activist hedge fund can team up with other managers 
(usually hedge funds) and form a “wolf–pack,” where each of the 
participants purchases a share of the target’s equity, which is below the 
threshold prompting a major shareholder’s disclosure obligation.89  A wolf–
pack allows activist hedge funds to circumvent disclosure rules and to 
secretly acquire or build upon sizeable stakes without triggering a strong 
upward price adjustment.  While not all jurisdictions subject all forms of 
cooperation to mandatory disclosure, regulators have generally made the 
wolf–pack technique subject to disclosure.90 
Before concluding this Section, it is important to note that the 
mandatory bid rule, which requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all 
the shareholders once it has accumulated a certain percentage of the 
 
 88.   See Weber & Zimmermann, supra note 82, at 1020 (discussing German regulations 
and disclosure requirements for activist hedge funds). 
 89.   See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Challenging Wolf Packs: Thoughts on Efficient Enforcement 
of Shareholder Transparency Rules (Ctr. for Bus. & Corporate Law, Working Paper CBC–
RPS No. 0044/09, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1428899 (proposing new 
shareholder transparency rules to battle secret acquisition strategies). 
 90.   Under U.S. securities regulation, a wolf-pack may account for deemed beneficial 
ownership under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.  Specifically, any two or more activist 
funds will be considered as one aggregated filing group  if they have agreed to act together 
“for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing” of the shares. 17 C.F.R. § 
240.13d-5(b) (2014).  Shares held via swaps or other financial instruments may also meet 
the requirements of an “agree[ment] to act together.”  Id.  This was the case in CSX v. TCI, 
where the court ruled that TCI, which held a large stake of up to 14% indirectly based on 
swap agreements, was acting in concert with another hedge fund, 3G, and formed a “group.”  
CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt., 654 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2011).  
Therefore, 3G was required to disclose its collaborative activities.  Id. 
   In Europe, shares held in wolf-packs may meet the percentage tests used in disclosure 
rules.  For the purposes of the shareholder transparency rules, the notification requirements 
apply to cases of an “agreement” which “obliges” to adopt “by concerted exercise of the 
voting rights, a lasting common policy towards the management of the issuer in question.”  
Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 10(a), at 47.  Shares held via financial 
instruments may also meet the requirements of the acting-in-concert test.  Id. art. 13, at 49. 
   Furthermore, some E.U. Member States, for example Germany and France, have widened 
the “acting in concert” situation, which triggers the notification duty under the Transparency 
Directive.  See Commission Report on Transparency Directive, supra note 70, at 27. 
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shares,91 is likely to have an additional impact upon the stake–building of 
activist wolf–packs.  Although activist hedge funds almost never make 
takeover bids and rarely come close to owning stakes large enough to 
trigger the mandatory bid rule, a wolf–pack of activist hedge funds which 
reaches the mandatory bid threshold may find itself subject to an obligation 
to make a general offer.92  In the European Union, the current definition of 
acting in concert provided by the Takeover Directive gives wide discretion 
to E.U. Member States as to the meaning of control.  Discretion is given to 
such an extent that it allows E.U. Member States to adopt definitions that 
establish limits to concerted shareholder action.93  For example, while 
under the U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, a wolf–pack will 
trigger a bid requirement only if the participating activists request a general 
meeting to consider a “board control–seeking” resolution or threaten to do 
so.94  Other E.U. Member States, like Germany and France, have 
 
 91.   In the European Union, anyone acquiring control of a listed company is required to 
make an offer addressed to all holders of securities for all their holdings at a price at least 
equal to the highest price paid in the period preceding the acquisition, unless an exemption 
or a discount on price is granted by the supervisory authority.  Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) 
[hereinafter “Takeover Directive”], art. 5, at 17. 
   However, the mandatory bid rule is not part of U.S. takeover regulation.  For an excellent 
account of the differences in takeover regulation between the United Kingdom and the 
United States, see John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why?–The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007) (discussing the regulatory differences for hostile takeovers between 
the United States and the United Kingdom). 
 92.   For details on the particular thresholds across the E.U. Member States, see 
Takeover Directive, supra note 91, at Annex 2 (requiring mandatory bids for acquisition of 
30% of voting rights in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; and for one-third of the voting rights in 
Portugal, Slovakia, Luxemburg and France).  It is noteworthy that Denmark and Italy have 
recently lowered their mandatory bid thresholds, so that a tender offer needs to be made 
once the bidder has accumulated one-third of the company’s equity.  See Marc Goergen et 
al., Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms In 
Europe, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 243, 250, 255 (2005). 
 93.   Takeover Directive, supra note 91, art. 2.1.d, at 15: 
[P]ersons acting in concert shall mean natural or legal persons who 
cooperate with the offeror or the offeree company on the basis of an 
agreement, either express or tacit, either oral or written, aimed either at 
acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful 
outcome of a bid. 
 94.   THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS (THE CODE) Note 2 to Rule 9.1, at 133–4 (11th ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf. 
   A resolution will be normally classified as “board control seeking” if there is a 
“relationship” between the activist shareholders and the proposed directors.  Absent a 
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introduced ambiguous definitions of acting in concert which might 
arguably lead to a certain degree of uncertainty and deter activist hedge 
funds from concerted action.95 
C. The Disciplining Stage: Shareholder Rights 
In this Section, the emphasis turns to the impact of the legal 
environment on the third stage of an activist campaign—the disciplining 
stage.  The intensity and effectiveness of the activist hedge funds’ actions 
at the disciplining stage depend decisively on what pressure they can bring 
to bear as shareholders.  However, exercising the rights bestowed on 
shareholders by corporate law is not necessarily the typical form of hedge 
fund activism.  Activist hedge funds often use behind–the–scenes 
negotiations, approach the target management through letters and meetings, 
or use the media to publicly articulate their demands.96  All these strategies 
involve unilateral decision–making on the part of target management and 
do not involve any use of formal shareholder rights on the part of the 
activist(s).  Yet a shareholder–friendly regulatory framework is likely to 
have an indirect impact on behind–the–scenes or public, but informal, 
negotiations with the incumbents by giving an activist hedge fund a 
powerful negotiation advantage at the private stage.  A commentator (in the 
United Kingdom) remarked that “[t]he detailed legal rules governing the 
holding and conduct of meetings of shareholders can . . . be significant if it 
comes to a public fight.”97  In other words, the more shareholder-friendly 
the regulatory framework is, and therefore the more likely an activist hedge 
fund’s public campaign is to be successful, the more powerful the private 
pressure an activist hedge fund can put on a target.  The legal rules 
 
relationship, the U.K. Takeover Panel will look at the number of directors to be appointed or 
replaced compared with the size of the board.  Further, on the meaning of a board-control 
seeking resolution, see id. 
 95.   See Santella et al., supra note 39, at 280. 
 96.   For empirical evidence on the strategies employed by activist hedge funds, see 
infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text. 
   More recently, activist investors have used social media to support activist campaigns, 
especially in the United States.  For instance, Carl Icahn first used Twitter to express his 
concern over Dell Inc.’s buyout in 2013, and also made extensive use of Twitter in his proxy 
contest for eBay Inc.  Reacting to this growing use of social media, the SEC staff issued new 
guidance in April 2014 on the use of social media in proxy contests.  See, e.g., Social Media 
and Proxy Contests, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Jul. 10, 2014 (discussing shareholder 
activists’ use of social media); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITIES ACT RULES (2015), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm. 
 97.   PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 425 
(8th ed. 2008). 
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determining the activist hedge fund decision-making power is, therefore, of 
major importance. 
The rest of this Section examines three sets of rules that are likely to 
empower the insurgent(s) in constraining the board’s discretion at the 
disciplining stage of an activist hedge fund campaign.  The first set of rules 
concerns the extent to which activist hedge funds can utilize the 
shareholder decision–making procedures to influence the incumbents and 
exercise a veto over board initiatives.  In challenging the incumbents’ 
decisions, however, the right to elect the board of directors and, when 
necessary, to take remedial action in the form of board dismissals and 
election of new directors is by far the most persuasive tool for activist 
shareholders.  Finally, activist hedge funds occasionally resort to 
shareholder–driven litigation to accelerate an activist campaign.  Takeover 
rules might also have an impact on the disciplining stage of an activist 
campaign; previous empirical studies suggest, however, that activist hedge 
funds rarely intend to take control of the target companies with a takeover 
bid, for example.98  Therefore, the influence of the takeover rules, if any, on 
hedge fund activism, remains out of the scope of this study. 
1. Shareholder Decision–making Power 
The brand of shareholder activism associated with hedge funds has 
serious consequences for the policies of the target company, ranging from 
cash payouts to the sale of the target company at a premium following the 
activist campaign, and from governance overhauls to direct governance 
participation on the target board.99  Although activist hedge funds most 
often call for a board decision rather than for a decision of the shareholders 
through the general meeting, it is the threat of shareholder intervention that 
motivates the board to act.100  Thus, the questions of how legal regimes 
facilitate shareholder participation and what formal rights shareholders 
have that maximize their influence in general meetings shape the core of 
the analysis in this Section. 
Modern company laws oblige public companies to organize a general 
meeting at least once a year, while special meetings are called when 
 
 98.   Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1745; Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 493 (reporting 
that activist hedge funds seek to launch a takeover bid only in 4.2% and 3.9% of the studied 
samples, respectively). 
 99.   See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1405 (2007) (analyzing the effects that hedge funds have on their targets). 
 100.  For empirical evidence, see Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 486 (reporting only 64 
formal shareholder proposals out of the 883 activist strategies examined). 
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unusual circumstances arise and particular decisions (e.g., merger) need to 
be ratified by shareholders.101  When the general shareholder meeting is 
convened by the board, the main protection for the shareholders lies in the 
information about the agenda made available to them in advance of the 
meeting102 and the length of the required notice.103  For example, timely and 
detailed information on the precise context of proposals for resolutions may 
assist activists in taking an active part in shareholder meetings and voting 
down a management resolution.104  However, empirical evidence suggests 
that activist hedge funds rarely vote against management proposals unless 
an activist campaign is underway.105 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 336–40 (U.K.) (promulgating the 
requirements of an annual meeting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211 (2001) (requiring annual 
shareholder meetings). 
 102.  See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 311, 311A (U.K.), as amended by Article 
10 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (requiring disclosure to 
shareholders prior to the annual meeting).  In Delaware, an agenda has to be attached only 
for cases of special meetings, but the shareholders have the right to inspect corporate 
records.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220, 222(a) (2001).  Further, on the shareholder 
information rights under U.S. state laws, see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 
212–21 (West 2nd ed. 2010).  In both countries, the annual accounts are sent out along with 
the notice of the meeting.  See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 423–436 (U.K.) (requiring 
companies to send notice and information of the meeting to shareholders); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-3(b) (2014) (requiring corporations to disclose information to shareholders). 
 103.  See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 307A (U.K.), as amended by Article 9(2) 
of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (requiring 21 days’ notice 
in the case of an annual general meeting or 14 days’ notice in other cases).  In the United 
States, the time limit for calling a general meeting is 10 days.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 
222(b) (2001) (promulgating general meeting guidelines).  A special procedure requires a 
motion to be made under SEC Rule 14a-8, in good time.  For ordinary general meetings, 
shareholder proposals must be submitted 120 days before proxy statements are sent out.  17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2014); see also MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER 
LAW 97 (2008) (examining the differences in the time limits and information about the 
agenda in six countries: China, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States). 
 104.  Alternatively, an activist may simply make its views on an item which has already 
been on the agenda known to other shareholders in advance of the meeting, thereby hoping 
to encourage other shareholders to attend the meeting, in person or by proxy, and support 
those views.  See, e.g., Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 
17 (EC), art 6, at 21 and Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 314-316 (U.K.) (empowering 
shareholders to circulate statements on agenda items).  It is unlikely, however, that this 
right, if available, can be of any use for activist hedge funds which seek to proactively 
influence the incumbents’ strategy and not simply express their opinions to their fellows 
shareholders. 
 105.  See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 486 (reporting that 47 out of the 883 activist 
tactics studied included events in which the hedge fund voted down the incumbents’ 
resolution(s)). 
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Rather than voting down a management resolution, activist hedge 
funds often seek to add a shareholder proposal to the agenda of a meeting 
that the board has already called.106  In such cases, the threshold share 
requirement for shareholders to be able to add an item to the agenda, which 
is typically 5 percent of the registered capital,107 is likely to matter for an 
activist campaign.  How easily activist hedge funds can get across the 
percentage threshold and add an item to the agenda depends, however, on 
the size of the company; activist hedge funds can easily get across the 
percentage threshold in small companies, but owning 5 percent in a very 
large company takes a serious amount of investment. 
Alternative criteria for requiring a resolution to be placed on the 
agenda are also sometimes established, such as the 100–member 
requirement under the U.K. Companies Act 2006.108  This requirement is 
increasingly seen as a viable option for placing shareholder resolutions in 
large public companies.  In 2002, for instance, Laxey Partners bought 2 
percent of British Land stock through 100 nominee accounts and placed 
motions on the agenda of the annual general meeting.109  More recently, in 
2011, the British hedge fund used a similar tactic in its activist campaign to 
reform Alliance Trust, namely it split its 1.3 percent ownership stake in 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(a) and 338A(3)(a) (U.K.), as 
amended by Article 17 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 
(barring shareholders with insufficient equity from proposing agenda items). 
   However, lower thresholds are found, for instance, in the United States at 1%. See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2014) (allowing a shareholder with a 1% stake to make 
proposals). Despite the relevant low threshold for adding an item into the agenda of a 
meeting under Rule 14–a8(b) of Regulation 14A, securities regulation associated with the 
system of proxy voting has various ramifications for activist hedge funds targeting 
American companies. While any shareholder may collect proxies for matters relating to the 
general meeting under Rule 14a–7, he/she must bear the costs.  By contrast, holders of 1% 
of the company’s shares for at least one year may place shareholder proposals on the 
company’s proxy statement without incurring any costs under Rule 14a–8.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8 (2014) (promulgating the right of shareholders to propose agenda items).   
 108.  See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(b), 338A(3)(b) (U.K.), as amended by 
Article 17 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (support 
“[f]rom at least 100 members who have a right to vote at the meeting and hold shares in the 
company on which there has been paid up an average sum, per member, of at least £100” is 
required).  See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2014) (allowing shareholder proposals 
from those with holdings of at least $2,000 market value). 
 109.  See Norma Cohen, Laxey Throws Down Gauntlet to British Land, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2002, at 24 (noting the use of the 100-member requirement).  In this case, the activist 
fund took advantage of section 376 of the previous Companies Act 1985, which similarly 
allowed a group of 100 shareholders to place an item on the agenda of a company’s annual 
meeting.  This right is now found in Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(b) and 
338A(3)(b) (U.K.). 
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Alliance Trust between 100 different nominee accounts and placed 
resolutions at the annual general meeting to force a share buyback.110  
Similarly, in 2007 the activist fund Efficient Capital Structure bought 
0.0004 percent of Vodafone stock, set up 100 nominee accounts in order to 
achieve the threshold, and placed a resolution at the company’s annual 
general meeting calling for the Vodafone’s holding in Verizon Wireless to 
be spun off.111 
In addition to the right to add an item to the agenda, the power of 
shareholders to call for a special general meeting (calling right), when 
available,112 provides an additional weapon to activist hedge funds in 
challenging the incumbents.  Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
activist hedge funds outside the United States frequently avail themselves 
of the calling rights, which are generally linked to a 5 percent ownership 
threshold, and request special general meetings, proposing, among others, 
the replacement of the target company directors.  For instance, Paulson & 
Co, a New York–based fund, holding a 19 percent stake in Algoma, one of 
Canada’s largest steel-makers, asserted the right provided by Canadian law 
to request a special shareholder meeting in November 2005 at which it 
proposed the replacement of the majority of the board of directors and a 
 
 110.  See Miles Costello, Bramson’s Triumph Inspires Laxey to Do the Same; Activist 
Investor Demands Reform at Alliance Trust, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 8, 2011, at 35 
(discussing activist shareholders’ use of the 100-member requirement). 
 111.  See Helen Johnson, Shareholder Activism in The Retail Sector, MONTAQ BUS. 
BRIEFING, Jul. 16, 2009 (reporting that meeting the 100-members requirement was said to 
cost the Efficient Capital Structure £78,500, but accumulating 5% of Vodafone would have 
cost £4.1bn); Cassell Bryan-Low & Jason Singer, Agitation at Vodafone Shows Activists 
Can Be Small or Big, WALL ST. J., Jun. 8, 2007, at C1. 
 112.  See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 303 (U.K.), as amended by Article 4 of 
The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632: 
The directors are required to call a general meeting once the company has 
received requests to do so from—(a) members representing at least the required 
percentage of such of the paid-up capital of the company as carries the right of 
voting at general meetings of the company (excluding any paid-up capital held 
as treasury shares); or (b) in the case of a company not having a share capital, 
members who represent at least the required percentage of the total voting rights 
of all the members having a right to vote at general meetings. 
In the United States, however, the board of directors has the power to call special meetings 
and shareholder callings rights can be granted only in the charter or bylaws.   See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8 § 211(d) (2001) (stating “[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by 
the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of 
incorporation or by the bylaws.”).  In practice, companies’ charter or bylaws rarely entitle 
shareholders to call special meetings.  See, e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in 
Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 
732 (2005) (arguing that the absence of a mandatory minimum percentage of share capital to 
call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting in Delaware law makes it more difficult for 
shareholders to call an extraordinary meeting). 
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cash-payout.113  On the other side of the Atlantic, in the United Kingdom, 
activist hedge funds often assert their calling rights provided by the 
Companies Act 2006 and call special general meetings.  Prominent 
examples include the boardroom coup at Wyevale Garden Centers in 
December 2005 following a general meeting forced by Laxey Partners, a 
British hedge fund with a nearly 29 percent ownership stake in Wyevale;114 
and the special general meeting called by JO Hambro, an activist fund, 
together with Morley Fund Management and Insight Investment 
Management to replace the non-executive chairman of SkyePharma,115 
among others. 
For the activist hedge fund activity related to shareholder meetings, 
what matters is not only what quantitative preconditions have to be set for 
passing a resolution of the general meeting in order for it to be binding in 
principle on all shareholders or for initiating a special general meeting, but 
also what competences the general meeting has in contradistinction to 
management.  Routine business decisions generally fall within the 
exclusive authority of the board of directors.116  However, shareholders’ 
meetings have certain powers to initiate resolutions or veto decisions that 
fundamentally reallocate power among the firm’s participants.  For 
instance, activist shareholders targeting British companies can instruct the 
board to sell the company or amend the articles of association even if the 
incumbents disagree, provided that the issue is properly noticed and is 
approved by more than 75 percent of voting shares.117  Of course, even 
when the insurgent(s) has the reserve power to direct the board to take, or 
 
 113.  See Mara Lemos Stein, Canadian Law Makes Activist Plays Easier than in U.S., 
HEDGE FUND TRADES, Dec. 5, 2005. 
 114.  Jenny Davey, Executive Sacked for a Pinch Takes Over as Head of Wyevale, TIMES 
(LONDON), Dec. 23, 2005, at 45. 
 115.  Andrew Jack, Rebel Investors in SkyePharma Seek Chairman’s Control, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at 20. 
 116.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2001).  See The Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, Part 2, ¶ 3 (U.K.) [hereinafter “U.K. Model Articles”] 
(holding directors responsible for the management of the company’s business). 
 117.  See U.K. Model Articles, supra note 116, Schedule 3, ¶ 4 (describing the 
shareholders’ reserve power); Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 314, ¶¶2a to b and § 338, ¶¶3a 
to b (U.K.) (stating that companies are required to circulate shareholder statements and 
proposed resolutions whenever asked by shareholders representing at least 5% of voting 
rights or by 100 shareholders).  See also id. § 283 (showing that 75% consent by the 
majority is needed for special resolutions to pass). 
   By contrast, in the United States, shareholders can only veto fundamental changes, 
including charter amendments or mergers, after such changes have been proposed by the 
board of directors.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b)(1) (2001).  The code states the rules that 
must be followed to make charter amendments, mergers and consolidation, and 
(dissolution).  Id. §§ 251(c), 275(b). 
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refrain from taking, specified action, as is the situation in the United 
Kingdom, it is rather uncommon for activist hedge funds to overrule the 
board in this way.118  A supermajority vote is hard to come by and, more to 
the point, a simple majority is enough in the United Kingdom, as we will 
see in the next Section, to remove the board of directors. 
2. Appointment and Removal of Directors 
A central tenet of an activist hedge fund campaign is the threat or 
actual use of the shareholder rights to elect and remove corporate directors.  
Empirical evidence from activist hedge fund campaigns on both sides of 
the Atlantic indicates that activist hedge funds often channel their 
campaigns into battles at the general meeting to replace the target’s board 
with the insurgents’ nominees, who would look on the activist demands 
more favorably.119 
In general, shareholders have the authority to elect and remove 
directors.  Although the board of directors proposes the company’s slate of 
nominees, in most jurisdictions, a qualified minority of shareholders can 
contest the board’s slate by placing additional nominees on the agenda of 
the shareholders’ meeting.120  Legally–protected board representation for 
minority shareholders in countries like Italy might further enhance the 
 
 118.  See Maggie Urry, Rebels Court Rock Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at 21 
(describing a rare instance of exercising this right in the case of the joint activist campaign 
of SRM Global and RAB Capital in Northern Rock).  The two hedge funds, holding more 
than 17% of Northern Rock’s shares, requested a special general meeting and placed 
resolutions to restrict the board’s ability to issue shares and sell assets without explicit 
approval from shareholders.  Id. 
 119.  See Klein and Zur, supra note 71, at 213, 215 (finding that a total of 40% of the 
hedge fund campaigns involved an actual (12%) or threatened (28%) proxy contest over the 
election of directors); Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1743 (finding that activist hedge funds 
actually waged proxy fights to gain board representation in 13.2% of the total activist events 
in their sample); Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 488 (reporting that in 54 of the 883 activist 
tactics studied, the hedge fund used formal voting challenges to the tenure of elected 
directors). 
 120.  See U.K. Model Articles, supra note 116, Schedule 3, art. 20 (stipulating the default 
rule in the United Kingdom that any shareholder can present his/her own board candidates 
in advance of the meeting). 
   However, in the United States, insurgents must instead solicit their own proxies and 
distribute their own solicitations to contest the company’s slate of nominees.  Although 
federal rules limit proxy access, the bylaws of Delaware corporations may provide for 
individuals nominated by a shareholder to be included in the corporate ballot under certain 
conditions.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 112 (Supp. 2009).  Also, following the 2010 
amendments to Rule 14a-8, shareholders are permitted to submit proposals that relate to 
nomination or election of a company’s board of directors or procedures for such nomination 
or election.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014). 
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shareholders’ control over the appointment process.121  Empirical evidence 
reveals, however, that activist hedge funds have not yet fully taken 
advantage of the legally–protected board representation for minority 
shareholders in Italy, and have only rarely nominated minority–appointed 
directors for the board of directors and the board of statutory auditors.122 
The law can achieve a similar result on a broader scale by mandating 
cumulative or proportional voting rules.123  Cumulative voting allows 
shareholders to cast all their votes in director elections for a single director.  
Cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by 
ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a 
candidate of their choosing to the board, and is seen by corporate 
governance reformers and mainstream institutional investors as a 
mechanism to improve shareholder representation on boards.  However, 
although shareholder proposals that require cumulative voting for the 
election of directors have been popular among mainstream institutional 
investors,124 activist hedge funds have not frequently lobbied for cumulative 
voting in the course of their campaigns.125 
More often, however, activist hedge funds take advantage of 
shareholder-led nomination committees, when available, and actively 
engage in the nomination process.126  A prominent example is Cevian 
Capital, the largest activist investor in Europe.  As part of its activist 
agenda, the investment firm secures seats on boards or nomination 
committees and plays an active part at the board level.127  Cevian Capital 
 
 121.  Erede, supra note 30, at 350–53.  
 122.  Id. at 359, 365–67. 
 123.  See generally Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of 
Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 91 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2009) (compiling the availability 
of cumulative voting across six countries: France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). 
 124.  See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in 
the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 57 (2007) (finding that adopting cumulative 
voting has consistently been among the top three shareholder proposals by institutional 
investors in the United States). 
 125.  In a rare example of hedge fund activism directed at cumulative voting, Luminus 
Management, a New York-based fund holding 8% of Transalta’s shares, put forward four 
shareholder proposals relating to the amendment of the articles of association to provide for 
cumulative voting.  Scott Haggett, TransAlta Says Board to Study Shareholder’s Demands, 
REUTERS NEWS (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/17/transalta-
luminus-idUSN1739876820071217. 
 126.  See, e.g., Richard Mine, Model Management; Scandinavia, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2013, at 34 (discussing the availability of nomination shareholder committees in Nordic 
countries). 
 127.  Alistair Barr, Cevian Carves Profitable Niche in Europe, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 
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has taken board representations and agitated for changes at Lindex, 
Skandia, Volvo, and Swedbank, to name a few of its targets.128 
Some countries further empower the shareholders to remove a director 
by a simple majority at any time.  For instance, in the United Kingdom, an 
activist hedge fund or a group of activists representing at least 5 percent of 
the voting share capital can call a special meeting and put forward an 
ordinary resolution to remove any or all directors at any time during their 
term without cause.129  The removal power exercisable by ordinary majority 
can be a powerful inducement to the target company’s directors to follow 
the line of action preferred by an activist hedge fund, because if the target 
company’s directors choose not to follow the shareholders’ views, they can 
be removed by ordinary majority.  To put it simply, if the incumbents do 
not initiate the changes an activist hedge fund perceives as value–
enhancing, the activist will try to replace the board with one that will make 
the changes.  Professor Lucian Bebchuk has further suggested that 
“because management knows that shareholders have the power to replace 
the board, management generally will not neglect shareholder interests to 
begin with, and shareholders will not need to exercise their replacement 
power.”130  This is why sometimes just the threat that the activist hedge 
fund will replace the board is enough to make the incumbents comply with 
the activist’s demands. 
3. Litigation 
So far we have analyzed the opportunities activist hedge funds have to 
intervene directly in the management of the company by securing the 
passing of resolutions binding the company (governance rights) and by 
 
10, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cevian-carves-profitable-niche-in-europe-
2010-11-19. 
 128.  Charles Fleming, Icahn, Gardell Team Up to Take 4% Stake in Metso, WALL ST. J., 
May 25, 2005, at C4; David Ibison, Boost for Cevian over Volvo Fight, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2006, at 25; Barr, supra note 127. 
 129.  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 168, 303 (U.K.).  By contrast, in Delaware, only 
directors of a non-staggered board can be removed by shareholders without cause.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(k) (2001).  In a non-staggered board, the whole board has a one-year 
term and is subject to reelection at each annual general meeting.  By contrast, in a staggered 
board, only one third of the directors are up for reelection.  However, boards are staggered 
in the majority of U.S. companies, in which case the default rule of Delaware corporate law 
is that the directors can only be removed for cause.  Id.  See the leading case Ralph 
Campbell v Loew’s Inc., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. 1957), which describes what amounts to 
“cause.”  More importantly, whether the board is staggered or not, shareholders in Delaware 
cannot themselves call a special meeting to vote out board members, unless there are 
specific provisions in the corporate charter.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 130.  Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 39, at 851. 
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removing members of the board so as to surmount their resistance (removal 
rights).  In addition to resorting to the governance and removal rights, an 
alternative route for an activist hedge fund to implement its objectives is to 
threaten or actually pursue litigation on behalf of the company against the 
alleged wrongdoing directors (derivative claims).  This strategy is 
sometimes an essential part of activist hedge fund campaigns targeting U.S. 
companies—as when Cardinal Capital Management filed a derivative 
lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty against the board of directors of 
Hollinger International,131 or when activist hedge fund Costa Brava filed 
several derivative claims against Telos Corporation.132 
However, outside the United States, filing a suit alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duties by directors and officers is not a preferable way for activist 
hedge funds to put pressure on the incumbents.  Consider, for example, the 
statutory derivative claim introduced in the United Kingdom by the 
Companies Act 2006.133  While the new regime has been envisaged as 
“provid[ing] another tool for use by activist shareholders to push for 
change at under–performing companies,”134 the incentives for activists to 
bring such actions are still weak.135  An activist hedge fund “has little 
financial incentive to sue on behalf of the company, because the return to 
[the activist] will be, at most, a percentage of the recovery which reflects 
the percentage of the shares of the company [the activist] holds.”136 
While recourse to derivative litigation is unlikely to be a cost–
effective tactic, activist hedge funds sometimes get involved in legal 
disputes with their targets when other activist strategies fail to yield the 
desired results.  Examples include Implenia, a Swiss construction group, 
where Laxey Partners took legal action in an attempt to raise its share of 
 
 131.  Barbara Shecter, Hollinger Executives Accused of “Diverting Hundreds of 
Millions”: Shareholder Lawsuit, NAT’L POST, Jan. 3, 2004, at 1. 
 132.  See Marr Kendra, Telos Prevails After 3 Years of Battling Shareholder, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 21, 2008, at D01 (stating that after a lawsuit was filed on behalf of the 
shareholder, more than half the board of directors stepped down). 
 133.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 260–269 (U.K.). 
 134.  Arad Reisberg, Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much About 
Nothing?, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.D. PRENTICE 17 
(John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009) (explaining in depth the new regime of 
derivative claims in the United Kingdom and assessing its impact). 
 135.  Compare Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2), (1975) 2 W.L.R. 389 (showing that an 
activist hedge fund in the United Kingdom which decides to bring a derivative claim must 
not only pay its own legal costs, but also bears the risk of being ordered to pay the defendant 
directors’ costs subject to the possibility of gaining indemnity from the company), with 
GEVURTZ, supra note 102, at 407–70 (showing that the risk an activist hedge fund runs by 
losing the suit is less severe in the United States where contingency fees are available). 
 136.  DAVIES, supra note 97, at 609. 
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voting rights and forced Implenia into mediation talks;137 or Stork, a Dutch 
industrial group, where hedge funds Centaurus Capital and Paulson Co. 
filed a court complaint after Stork issued preference shares to the Stock 
Foundation to dilute the activists’ stake ahead of a special meeting called 
by the two hedge funds.138 
Activist hedge funds also resort to litigation in the context of mergers 
& acquisitions as blocking acquirers (trying to block the deal as 
shareholders of the potential acquirer) or blocking bidders (trying to block 
the deal or improve the terms as shareholders of the potential target).139  For 
instance, Paulson Co., a New York activist hedge fund, objected to the 31 
Canadian dollars per share bid paid for Deer Creek Energy Ltd. by Total 
SA, and launched a court action under so–called dissenter’s rights to seek a 
higher price.140  Meanwhile in the Netherlands, a group of minority 
shareholders, led by Centaurus Capital Ltd, a British activist hedge fund, 
used litigation, along with other tactics, to fight the Swedish Tele2’s offer 
for Versatel, the Dutch telecommunications company.141  Finally, activist 
hedge funds can invoke their appraisal rights, namely the right to exit at a 
fair price if they do not approve the contested transaction, when these are 
available.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that activist hedge funds, 
especially in the United States, often challenge the liquidation value as 
determined by the board of directors, and if they are unable to obtain better 
terms they threaten to file a statutory appraisal action. 142  One of the most 
recent, high-profile appraisal rights cases involved Carl Icahn’s campaign 
against the Dell going–private transaction in which the threat of invoking 
appraisal rights was one of the several factors that led to a higher buyout 
price.143 
 
 137.  Implenia Shares Fall, Laxey Exerts Pressure, REUTERS, July 23, 2007. 
 138.  Ian Bickerton, Hedge Funds Try to Block Stork Foundation’s Vote, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2007, at 17. 
 139.  For empirical evidence on this type of hedge fund activism, see Katelouzou, supra 
note 14, at 492–98. 
 140.  Claudia Cattaneo, Fight Over Deer Creek Deal, NAT’L POST, Sept. 1, 2006, at FP1. 
 141.  Ian Bickerton, Versatel Under Renewed Attack, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2007, at 21. 
 142.  See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 1038–39; Kaja Whitehouse and David 
Enrich, Investors Tapping Arcane Law to Win Bigger Merger Payouts, DOW JONES NEWS 
SERV., Feb. 5, 2007, available at Factiva, Doc. No. DJFHFT0020070720e3250013g (citing 
examples of the use of statutory appraisal actions in activist campaigns in the United States).  
For the potential use of the appraisal right from activist hedge funds in Italy, see Elisabetta 
Bellini, Hedge Fund Activism in Italy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 201, 226 (2009).  
 143.  Stephen M. Davidoff, Exercising appraisal rights as a fresh form of shareholder 
activism, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2014, at 16. 
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D. Theoretical Implications 
The analysis provided so far has considered whether and how law 
facilitates the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign, taking 
input from press and documentary sources.  Suppose that the legal rules I 
proposed above matter for hedge fund activism.  What results might one 
expect on the incidence and nature of hedge fund activism across different 
countries? 
One set of hypotheses involves the incidence and magnitude of 
worldwide hedge fund activism.  At the entry stage of an activist campaign, 
the preceding analysis suggests that a higher number of activist campaigns 
should be expected in countries with stronger mandatory disclosure of 
firm–specific information.144  The underlying rationale is that mandatory 
disclosure rules increase share price accuracy and address corporate 
governance agency problems, and by providing more public information, 
they can assist activist hedge funds in finding their targets.  We have also 
seen that a defining feature of the disciplining stage of hedge fund activism 
is the formal or informal use of shareholder rights to enhance shareholder 
value.145  A shareholder–friendly regulatory framework should arguably 
foster the incidence of hedge fund activism because of its impact on the 
disciplining stage of an activist campaign.  Another channel through which 
shareholder rights can affect the activist hedge funds’ intervention decision 
is by protecting minority shareholders and disciplining managerial 
behavior.  This protective function of shareholder rights reflects the law 
and finance literature which links the legal protection of minority 
shareholder rights with dispersed share ownership and robust capital 
markets.146  Correspondingly, all else being equal, activist hedge funds are 
likely to choose target companies incorporated in countries with stronger 
disclosure and shareholder protection regimes. 
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, we have seen that strict 
disclosure duties on significant holdings (either with having lower 
thresholds, shorter time windows, or catching non–voting economic 
positions and activist intentions) may limit the expected returns for 
 
 144.  See supra text with accompanying notes 52–61 (showing the impact of mandatory 
disclosure on the number of activist campaigns).  
 145.  See supra notes 96–130 and accompanying text (examining the formal use of 
shareholder rights to enhance shareholder value in the voting context and in connection with 
the removal of directors, and the informal exercise of these rights in behind-the-scenes 
negotiations and public articulation of activist demands through the media). 
 146.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the law 
and finance literature). 
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prospective activists.147  For example, one would expect an activist to build 
up a larger stake in the United States, where the initial threshold is 5 
percent, than in the United Kingdom, where an activist can engage in secret 
trading and conceal its presence from the incumbents up to 3 percent. 
Finally, with respect to the disciplining stage, the activist hedge funds’ 
choice of objectives and strategies might be a reflection of the shareholder 
protection regime of the country in which the target company is located.  
As seen above, a defining feature of the disciplining stage of hedge fund 
activism is the use of shareholder rights to enhance shareholder value—
meaning legal rules governing the scope of the shareholder decision–
making procedures that activist hedge funds have at their disposal to 
influence the corporate policy and governance, to exercise a veto over 
board initiatives, to elect directors, and to bring a suit alleging managerial 
wrongdoing.148  Correspondingly, all else being equal, one would expect 
that the nature of the stated objectives and the aggressiveness of the 
employed strategies would depend decisively on what pressure activist 
hedge funds could bring to bear as shareholder. 
The next two Parts of this Article present some preliminary empirical 
evidence that addresses these hypotheses based on a hand–collected dataset 
of activist hedge fund campaigns. 
III. HAND-COLLECTED DATASET OF ACTIVIST HEDGE FUND 
CAMPAIGNS 
A. Activism Sample and Data Collection 
In this Article, I extend the original dataset of activist hedge fund 
campaigns of 17 countries between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 
2010 to 25 countries.149  The geographic area chosen represents a range of 
developed (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and 
developing/emerging (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia, 
and Turkey) countries.  The countries vary along several important 
 
 147.  See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text (discussing four different aspects of 
ownership disclosure related to hedge fund activism and the impact each has at the trading 
stage). 
 148.  See supra notes 99–142 and accompanying text (examining how specific 
shareholder rights can empower activist hedge funds in constraining the incumbents’ 
discretion). 
 149.  Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 473. 
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dimensions, including the strength of their investor protection, their 
financial development, their legal traditions, and their ownership patterns. 
The selected geographic area had a great impact on the data collection.  
While empirical studies on hedge fund activism directed at U.S. companies 
are based on the detailed information disclosed by the Schedule 13D 
filings,150 data on hedge fund activism outside the United States are much 
harder to obtain and the sources vary enormously.  There is no uniform 
regulatory threshold requiring public disclosure of block holdings across 
my sample countries, and, therefore, it is not possible to identify the first 
purchase based, for example, on a 5 percent block–holder definition.  Also, 
unlike the United States, the sampled countries (except for Germany and 
France since 2008) do not require investors to disclose what goals they are 
pursuing with their stake building.151  The activist interventions and the 
related data have therefore been collected from two resources: the Dow 
Jones Factiva—an online database of business news—and regulatory 
filings for the countries whose filings are available in Factiva.152 
The data collection comprised a four–step procedure.153  As a first 
step, data were hand-gathered from press reports available from Factiva 
using the following search requests as inputs:  “hedge fund” and 
“shareholder” and “activist” for each of the 25 countries in the sample.  
Factiva searches revealed a large number of potential activist interventions, 
for which the names of the target company and the funds involved were 
recorded.  In a second step, I filtered out cases where the investor was not 
an activist hedge fund.  To identify which of the funds can be classified as 
activists, for the purposes of my analysis, I searched the internet for the 
websites of these funds and news articles describing them.  In most cases, I 
was able to filter out pension funds, individuals, regular companies, trusts, 
and private equity/venture capital funds.  For the remaining cases, I relied 
on Factiva and used the following search requests as input:  “(name of the 
fund)” within the same paragraph “activist fund.”  This screening yielded a 
second case list, including 131 activist hedge funds in the broad sense.  
Thirdly, I conducted a fresh news search in Factiva using the hedge fund 
and target company names as keywords, to identify further aspects of the 
activist campaigns, such as the activist hedge funds’ stated objectives and 
 
 150.  See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1736–37 (discussing the importance of 
Schedule 13D filings for empirical data). 
 151.  See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (detailing the process in the United 
States, the E.U, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). 
 152.   See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 474 n.60 (describing the Dow Jones Factiva 
database).  
 153.  See id. at 474-76 (describing the collection process in detail). 
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strategies.  Sometimes, extensive searches on high–profile cases shed light 
on other activist interventions.  These cases were recorded and separate 
searches (using the hedge fund and target company names as keywords) 
were undertaken. 
These three rounds of Factiva searches yielded a list of 934 activist 
fund–target pairs.  An activist campaign can include more than one hedge 
fund–target pair when a consortium of two or more activist funds, 
otherwise known as a wolf-pack, intervenes in the same target company.154  
From this case list, I excluded events where the activist hedge fund simply 
acquired a stake without putting any kind of pressure on the target (based 
on the reported hedge funds’ objectives and strategies), or where the 
primary purpose of the activist hedge fund was to engage in merger 
arbitrage.  The final sample is comprised of 432 activist campaigns 
sponsored by 129 activist hedge funds.  The sample involves 408 unique 
companies and 494 hedge fund–target pairs. 
Information about activist hedge funds’ stake holdings has been 
collected from hedge fund–related press reports and from targets’ annual 
reports.  Regulatory filings on “significant holdings” have also been taken 
into consideration for the countries whose filings are available in Factiva.  I 
further checked the accuracy of the activist ownership stakes, taking into 
consideration information on the sampled firms’ ownership structures from 
ORBIS/BvD—a global database of companies with data on descriptive 
information, financials, news, annual reports, ownership, and mergers and 
acquisitions.  Finally, I conducted extensive news searches in Factiva to 
identify the stated objectives and the employed strategies for each activist 
hedge fund campaign.  Because each activist hedge fund campaign may 
have more than one objective, the sample is comprised of 946 stated 
objectives and 883 activist strategies.  The difference in numbers between 
the stated objectives and the employed strategies is due to the fact that 
hedge funds often employ a single strategy to achieve more than one 
objective. 
B. The Incidence and Magnitude of Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism 
From the outset of this Article, I have noted that geographical 
variations in the incidence and magnitude of hedge fund activism across 
countries form the main motivation for studying the role of law in 
facilitating hedge fund activism.  Hedge fund activism originated in the 
United States and then spread out to other countries in Europe and Asia.  
 
 154.  I define an activist campaign as being launched by a “wolf-pack” when there is a 
group of activists who explicitly or implicitly engage with the board and exercise influence. 
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Although the U.S. market still has the greatest concentration of activist 
hedge funds and activist campaigns, there are many well–documented 
activist hedge fund interventions outside the United States.155 
Figure 2 breaks down the empirical findings by target country.  U.K. 
and Japanese firms dominate the sample, making up 53.47 percent of the 
total targets.  There are four other countries with at least 20 interventions:  
Canada, Germany, France, and the Netherlands.  Within Europe, U.K. 
companies are by far the dominant targets of activist hedge funds.  Figure 2 
shows that almost 53.8 percent of European activist campaigns target U.K. 
companies.  German companies are the second, much smaller, targets of 
activist hedge funds in Europe. 
 
Figure 2: Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns by Target Country 
 
Note: the following abbreviations are used: AR (Argentina), AU 
(Australia), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN 
(China), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), ES (Spain), FR (France), IN 
(India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia), 
NL (Netherlands), PK (Pakistan), RU (Russian Federation), SE (Sweden), 
SI (Slovenia), TR (Turkey), UK (United Kingdom), ZA (South Africa) 
 
The 432 activist campaigns were launched by 129 activist hedge 
funds.  The 54 different funds with three or more engagements are listed in 
Appendix 1.  These interventions are spread across the following countries:  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the 
 
 155.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing examples of hedge fund 
activism in Canada, Japan, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). 
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Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom, although they are highly concentrated in a 
handful of countries.156 
In the case list, there are some well–known activist hedge funds that 
have received wide public attention.  Examples include The Children’s 
Investment Fund (“TCI”), set up in 2004 by Chris Hohn;157 the Hermitage 
Fund, set up in 1996 by William Browder, which has built its reputation on 
its highly public engagements with Russian state–linked oil and gas 
companies;158 and the U.S. fund Steel Partners, founded by Warren 
Lichtenstein in 1990.159  Steel Partners has been particularly active in 
Japan, until 2008, through Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund, a joint 
venture with Boston–based Liberty Square Asset Management LLC, which 
was formed in 2002 as a special purpose investment vehicle to actively 
invest in undervalued stocks in Japan.160  The list also includes other funds 
that engage in shareholder activism, hedge–fund style.  Examples of 
traditional value–oriented fund managers, but with “offensive” activist 
stances, include Brandes and Tweedy Browne.161  Although mutual funds 
are not technically hedge funds, Franklin Mutual Advisers is also included 
in the sample, because it behaves like any other activist fund in that it 
builds up sizeable stakes proactively in order to influence the conduct of 
corporate affairs.162  Appendix 1 also includes some of the raiders of the 
1980s who have been resurfaced as activist funds, such as Guy Wyser–
Pratte, Vincent Bollore, Tito Tettamanti (Sterling Investment Group), and 
Ron Brierley (Guinness Peat Group).163 
 
 156.  See supra fig. 2. 
 157.  Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund With High Returns and High-Reaching Goals. 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006.11.13/us/ 
13hedge.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 158.  Georgina Leslie, Emerging Markets: Russia’s Crusader, GLOBAL INVESTOR (May 
1, 2002), available at http://www.globalinvestormagazine.com/Article/2228217/Search/ 
Results/Emerging-Markets-Russias-Crusader.html?Keywords=emerging+markets 
%3a+russia%27s+crusader. 
 159.  See Jason Singer, With ‘80s Tactics, U.S. Fund Shakes Japan’s Cozy Capitalism, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at A1 (discussing Steel Partner’s activist investments in Japan). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See e.g. Craig Karmin & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Bayer Meeting: View of Holder 
Activism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2001, at C1 (examining the activist campaign of Tweedy 
Browne in Bayer AG, the German chemical and pharmaceutical giant); James Boxell, 
Brandes cuts its final links with BAE Systems, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/04c56f88-353c-11da- 9e12-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3a2tbnLTa 
(discussing how Brandes, the US value investor, is adopting an increasingly activist stance 
in the UK). 
 162.  See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See, e.g., Raiders in the healing arts, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1998, at 1 (discussing 
how the so-called corporate raiders of the 1980s and 1990s, including Guy Wyser Pratte, are 
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Clearly, no single activist fund dominates the sample:  Laxey Partners 
is the most active hedge fund with 28 interventions, which comprises 
5.67% of all activist campaigns, while Steel Partners and the Murakami 
Fund follow with 27 and 24 interventions, respectively.164  Though the 
activist campaigns were launched by 129 different activist hedge funds, 
there were a few hedge funds that predominated.  The top ten activist hedge 
funds launched 37.1 percent of the activist events, while the top twenty 
launched 51.7 percent of the events studied.165 
But why do activist hedge funds invest in particular countries, such as 
the United Kingdom and Japan?  Do national differences in corporate law 
explain the different patterns in hedge fund activism?  The next Part 
addresses these questions and correspondingly examines how domestic, 
corporate, and securities laws may influence activist hedge funds as they 
find a potential target company and decide whether to buy shares and 
launch an activist campaign. 
IV. SOME PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this Part, I make an empirical assessment and provide some 
preliminary comparative evidence with respect to the effect on worldwide 
activist hedge fund campaigns of three sets of legal rules:  mandatory 
disclosure, ownership disclosure rules, and rights bestowed on shareholders 
by corporate law (which, in this context, means the legal rules governing 
the scope activist funds have to utilize the shareholder decision–making 
procedures to influence the corporate policy and governance, to exercise a 
veto over board initiatives, to elect and remove directors, and to bring 
shareholder–driven litigation). 
Before proceeding, I need to stress that because I focus only on 
activist hedge fund campaigns drawn from press reports, my analysis is 
limited to an empirical assessment of the legal dynamics of the publicized 
activist hedge fund campaigns, while behind the scenes negotiations and 
other informal activist attempts are probably under–represented in my 
sample.  Another caveat is that to account for how well different legal 
 
increasingly transforming to activist shareholders); Aaron O. Patrick, Bollore Focuses on 
Advertising as His New Game, WALL. ST. J. Jul. 1, 2006, at B1 (calling Vincent Bollore as 
“Carl Icahn with a French accent”); Andrea Felsted, Activist investors lift Amey holding, 
FIN. TIMES Nov. 28, 2002, at 27 (discussing the activist campaign of Tito Tettamanti’s 
Sterling Investment Group in Amey plc); Brierley the raider rides back in style, THE SUN. 
TIM., Aug. 2, 1998, available at Factiva Doc. No. st00000020010927du82007fo (explaining 
Sir Ron Brierley’s transformation from a corporate raider to a shareholder activist).  
 164.  See infra app. 1. 
 165.  See infra app. 1. 
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systems protect certain rights, I draw on the work of previous legal indices 
of shareholder protection and disclosure rules.166  A central methodological 
tenet of legal indices is that legal rules can be coded.  All legal indices 
involve the reduction of a complex institutional reality to a summary 
form—a variable coded with a number—which allows for statistical 
analysis.  Yet any empirical study devised to test the influence of legal 
rules inevitably captures only a part of the differences between legal 
systems.167  Diligent numerical coding, however, provides a fruitful basis 
for analyzing comparative corporate governance phenomena across a large 
number of countries in a very accessible, statistical form. 
A. The Entry Stage 
The empirical evidence presented in Part III of this Article reveals a 
considerable diversity in the incidence of activist campaigns around the 
world:  U.K. and Japanese companies are the prominent targets among the 
activist campaigns studied, while activist hedge funds engage in oversight 
activities less often in Continental Europe and developing countries.  The 
preceding analysis suggests that, all else being equal, activist hedge funds 
are likely to target companies incorporated in countries with stronger 
disclosure and shareholder protection regimes. 
To gauge whether the number of activist campaigns (ACTIVISM) 
differs significantly by the strength of the mandatory disclosure and 
shareholder protection, Table 1 computes (independent two–tailed) t–test 
and Mann–Whitney U–test statistics.168  ACTIVISM counts how often 
activist hedge funds target companies incorporated in the 25 sampled 
countries between 2000 and 2010.169   These tests are relevant to a 
 
 166.  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 167.  On the merits and limitations of the legal indices to account for differences of legal 
systems, see Katelouzou, supra note 53. 
 168.  I use a two-tailed test to test my hypotheses for robustness reasons.  An alternative 
possibility could be the use of a one-tailed test.  However, the one-tailed test can only test 
the effect in one direction disregarding the possibility of a relationship in the other direction.  
Thus, the use of one-tailed tests artificially increases the power of the test (i.e., the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis gets higher). 
   The t–test is a parametric test for testing the equality of means and is based on the 
normality assumption of the population.  The Mann–Whitney U–test, also known as 
Wilkoxon rank sum test, is a non-parametric test for testing the equality of the medians.  
Given the non-normality of the variable of interest—ACTIVISM—the parametric 
assumptions underlying the t-test may not hold.  The Mann-Whitney U-test is often used to 
guard against this possibility.  This test is robust in small samples and does not impose 
strong assumptions on the distributional properties of the data.  In the present context, the 
results of the non-parametric test are thus more reliable than those of the parametric t-test. 
 169.  See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:40 AM 
2015] WORLDWIDE HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 837 
 
preliminary empirical assessment of the legal parameters affecting the entry 
stage of an activist hedge fund campaign.  As a measure of how stringent 
the mandatory disclosure rules are, I use the prospectus disclosure index 
(DISCL) of the law and finance literature and I divide the sample into two 
regimes:  Low DISCL and High DISCL.170  DISCL is a measurement of six 
substantive elements of a country’s strength of disclosure requirements:  
(1) prospectus; (2) insiders’ compensation; (3) ownership by large 
shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) contracts outside the normal course 
of business; and (6) transactions with related parties.171  The cut–off 
between these two regimes is the median value of DISCL (=0.625).172  I 
classify the countries with a value of DISCL greater than the median of 
0.625 as High DISCL regimes, while the rest of the countries are classified 
as Low DISCL regimes.  Consistent with what is expected, the High DISCL 
countries have higher mean values of ACTIVISM than the Low DISCL 
countries; the t–test statistics reveal that the difference in mean ACTIVISM 
between the High DISCL (36.5) and the Low DISCL (6.2) countries is 
statistically significant at less than the 10 percent level (p=0.066). The 
difference in median ACTIVISM between the High DISCL and Low DISCL 
countries is also statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level 
(p=0.023). 
As a measure of the level of shareholder protection (SP) in the 
sampled countries, I use the 30–country shareholder protection index, 
which has been constructed under a project on “Law, Finance and 
Development” at the Centre for Business Research (CBR) in the University 
of Cambridge.173  The 30–country CBR index codes the level of 
shareholder protection over the period of 1990–2013 and is comprised of 
 
 170.  See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) 
(devising the prospectus disclosure index).  DISCL is, however, a fairly weak proxy for legal 
rules on periodic disclosure, as it is constructed so as to reflect the agency problems between 
prospective investors in an initial offering and the “promoter” who offers shares for the sale, 
and it is not necessarily a proxy for post-offering disclosure rules.  Unfortunately, reliable 
international data on post-offering periodic disclosure are not available.  Thus, for the time 
being, I must rely on DISCL as a rough proxy for mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 171.  Id. at 5–11. 
 172.  To calculate the median value of DISCL in my sample, I used La Porta’s data on 
“disclosure requirements” (DISCL). See id. at 15-16, tbl III.  
 173.  See John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: 
An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009) 
(relying on a previous CBR index which coded the shareholder protection rules for twenty 
countries).  See also Centre for Business Research, Project: Law, Finance, and 
Development, U. CAMBRIDGE, http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/ 
completed-projects/law-finance-development (last visited April 15, 2015) (explaining the 
variables and the coding methods involved). 
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the following ten variables:  (1) “powers of the general meeting for de facto 
changes”; (2) “agenda setting power”; (3) “anticipation of shareholder 
decision facilitated”; (4) “prohibition of multiple voting rights (super 
voting rights)”; (5) “independent board members”; (6) “feasibility of 
director’s dismissal”; (7) “private enforcement of director duties”; (8) 
“shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting”; (9) 
“mandatory bid”; and (10) “disclosure of major share ownership.”174  To 
construct SP, I calculate the arithmetic mean (average) of the aggregate 
score of the ten variables between 1999 and 2009 for each of the 25 
countries in my sample.175 
To test the impact of the shareholder protection rules on the incidence 
of hedge fund activism, I divide the sample into two regimes:  High SP and 
Low SP.  The cut–off between High SP and Low SP is the median value of 
SP (=5.641).  As expected, Panel B of Table 1 reports that the High SP 
countries have a higher number of activist campaigns than the Low SP 
countries.  The t–test statistic reveals that the difference in mean 
ACTIVISM between the High SP (29.62) and the Low SP (3.92) countries is 
statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level (p=0.049).  The 
difference in median ACTIVISM between the High SP and Low SP 
countries is also statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level 
(p=0.035). 
 
TABLE 1: LEGAL RULES’ EFFECT ON THE INCIDENCE OF HEDGE 
FUND ACTIVISM 
This table reports key statistics (number (N), mean, and standard deviation) 
for the dependent variable, ACTIVISM, by disclosure and shareholder protection 
regime.  Panel A divides the sample into two regimes—High DISCL and Low 
DISCL—and reports the t–statistics for the average differences and the Mann–
Whitney U–test rank statistics, which is asymptotically normal, for the median 
differences.  Countries with a value of DISCL that is greater than the median of 
value of DISCL for each sample are classified as High DISCL regimes, while those 
with a value of DISCL that is less than or equal to the median of DISCL for each 
sample are classified as Low DISCL regimes. 
 
 174.  On the 30-country CBR shareholder protection index, see Dionysia Katelouzou & 
Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evidence 
for 30 Countries, 1990-2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUDIES (forthcoming 2015). 
 175.  The CBR shareholder protection index, however, does not code Australia.  
Therefore, to measure shareholder protection in Australia, I rely on a study by Helen 
Anderson, Michelle Welsh, and Ian Ramsay, which employs the same variable definition 
and coding definition as the CBR index.  See Helen Anderson et al., Shareholder and 
Creditor Protection Indices Australia 1970-2010 (Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 641, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163809. 
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Panel B examines the difference in the number of activist campaigns by 
shareholder protection (SP).  Countries with a value of SP that is greater than the 
median value of SP for each sample are classified as High SP regimes, while those 
with a value of SP that is less than or equal to the median of SP for each sample are 
classified as Low SP regimes.  Panel B reports the t–statistics for the average 
differences and the Mann–Whitney U–test rank statistics, which is asymptotically 
normal, for the median differences.  
 
 
Panel A: ACTIVISM by Disclosure (DISCL) 
         
 High DISCL Low DISCL T–test Mann–
Whitney 
U–test 
 N Mean Sd N Mean Sd   
ACTIVISM 10 36.5 45.246 10 6.2 10.358 2.064* 2.280** 
         
Panel B: ACTIVISM by Shareholder Protection (SP) 
         
 High SP Low SP T–test Mann–
Whitney 
U–test 
 N Mean Sd N Mean Sd   
ACTIVISM 13 29.62 41.947 12 3.92 6.186 2.183** 2.158** 
 
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
B. The Trading Stage 
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, we have seen that several 
aspects of the disclosure rules on significant holdings limit the expected 
returns of prospective activists and have a chilling effect on the trading 
benefits of an activist campaign.176  To examine the impact of ownership 
disclosure rules on activist trading, I begin by describing the size of the 
activist ownership stakes across my sample countries.  Table 2 reports the 
mean and median maximum and minimum percentage of the activist 
 
 176.  See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text. 
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ownership blocks in the sample countries with more than ten activist 
campaigns (by location of the target company).  Evidently, there are big 
cross–country differences; activist hedge funds in Italy build small stakes 
(around 2 percent), whereas in the United Kingdom and Canada they build 
relatively large ones.  Also, in some countries—such as Canada, France, 
Germany, and Italy—the minimum (both mean and median) ownership 
stake falls under the triggering disclosure threshold.177  This might suggest 
that activist hedge funds try to remain behind the public scenes, at least at 
the beginning of their campaigns.  Unsurprisingly, activist hedge funds 
accumulate quite large ownership stakes in Canada, perhaps because they 
can trade secretly up to the 10 percent triggering threshold.178 
 
TABLE 2: MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM OWNERSHIP STAKES (%) HELD 
BY ACTIVIST HEDGE FUND 
The table presents the minimum (Column 1) and maximum (Column 2) 
ownership activist stakes (%) by hedge fund–target pairs.  I calculated the 
ownership activist stake on the basis of hedge fund–target pairs to account for the 
presence of wolf–packs.  Information about hedge funds’ stake holdings was 
collected from three sources: the hedge funds’ related press reports, the targets’ 
annual reports, and regulatory filings on “significant holdings” (for the countries 
whose filings are available in Factiva).  Of the 494 hedge fund–target pairs, 55 are 
excluded due to unavailability of ownership data.  Some of these unreported cases 
involve wolf–packs, in which there is no information for each participating fund’s 
stake, although the total ownership for a group is recorded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 177.  The initial disclosure threshold is set at 10% in Canada, 5% in Germany and 
France, and 2% in Italy for the period studied (2000–2010).  See infra note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
 178.  It is noteworthy that in March 2013 the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 
proposed, among other changes intended to provide greater transparency about significant 
holdings, to lower the reporting threshold from 10% to 5%.  However, in October 2014, the 
CSA announced that it will not be moving forward with the proposed reform.  See CSA 
Notice 62-307 Update on Proposed Amendments to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 Take-
Over Bids and Issuer Bids, National Instrument 62-103 Early Warning System and Related 
Take-Over Bid and Insider Reporting Issues and National Policy 62-203 Take-over Bids 
and Issuer Bids, CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/ 
en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20141010_62-307_proposed-admendments-multilateral-
instrument.htm. 
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 Minimum Ownership 
(1) 
Maximum Ownership 
(2) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Australia 6.71% 6.38% 12.04% 12.57% 
Canada 8.39% 8.61% 13.07% 12.10% 
France 4.06% 3.00% 9.08% 10.03% 
Germany 3.53% 2.92% 6.44% 5.68% 
Italy 1.84% 1.97% 2.90% 2.23% 
Japan 6.57% 5.00% 12.54% 10.00% 
Netherlands 5.97% 5.12% 9.50% 9.95% 
Switzerland 6.78% 6.70% 13.78% 9.45% 
UK 8.43% 4.50% 13.11% 10.93% 
All Countries 6.10% 4.93% 11.54% 10% 
 
A counterargument is that these findings could be driven by the initial 
thresholds necessitating public disclosure of share ownership.  To put it 
simply, it may well have been that the press coverage was driven by the 
disclosure rules, with reporters finding out about the interventions from the 
public disclosures.  Correspondingly, the press was finding out about 
instances of hedge fund activism in Italy that would have stayed below the 
radar in Canada, meaning that the size of the average stake I found for 
Canada would have been larger than the one I found for Italy.  However, in 
one–third of the activist campaigns studied, the filing is not the market’s 
first news of the activist ownership block; rather, the insurgent(s) 
accumulate an entry ownership stake which remains below the triggering 
ownership threshold.179  In 4 (out of 12) campaigns, the entry activist 
ownership stake remains below 2 percent; in 35 (out of 166) campaigns it 
 
 179.  A notable example is the Knight Vinke’s investment in the Italian oil company Eni 
SpA, where in 2009 Knight Vinke, having accumulated an ownership stake below 1%, 
publicly pressured Eni to break up.  See Vincent Boland Knight, Vinke Urges Eni Break Up, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92f124b8-adf2-11de-
87e7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UN3ucaXP.  Note that, in Italy, hedge funds are subject to 
the same disclosure requirements generally applicable to any investor with a shareholding 
higher than 2%, and then crossing or falling below 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 
40%, 45%, 50%, 66.6%, 75%, 90%, 95%.  See Erik Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and 
Control: A Comparative Study—Disclosure, Information and Enforcement (OECD 
Corporate Governance Working Paper, No. 7, 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
5k4dkhwckbzv-en. 
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remains below 3 percent; in 63 (out of 204) campaigns it remains below 5 
percent; and in 30 (out of 52) campaigns it remains below 10 percent, when 
the triggering thresholds are 2, 3, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.180  The 
boxplots in Figure 3 below confirm that activist hedge funds tend to amass 
lower thresholds in countries with lower initial ownership disclosure 
thresholds.  The median entry ownership stake of activist hedge funds is 
2.22, 5, 5.38, and 9.02 percent, respectively, in countries with 2, 3, 5, and 
10 percent initial notification thresholds, respectively; whereas in countries 
with no disclosure obligations, the average entry ownership stake is 19 
percent.  However, the median entry activist ownership stakes do not 
trigger notification of major shareholder rules in countries with a 10% 
triggering disclosure threshold. 
 
Figure 3: Activist Hedge Funds’ Entry Ownership Stakes by Initial 
Disclosure Threshold 
 
 
 
 
 180.  Italy has the lowest initial disclosure threshold (2%) among my sample countries.  
The United Kingdom applies a 3% threshold throughout the period studied, whereas 
Germany and Switzerland in 2007 and Spain in 2009 decreased the 5% initial disclosure 
threshold to 3% (in line with the U.K. regime).  Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden apply a 5% threshold throughout the period studied.  Malaysia 
replaced the previous 2% threshold with a 5% one in 2001, whereas Russia increased the 
initial 5% disclosure threshold to 25% in 2003, but decreased it again to 5% in 2006.  
Turkey is the only country in my sample that did not require any disclosure of major share 
ownership until 2002, when it introduced a 5% initial disclosure threshold.  Finally, Canada 
applies a 10% threshold.  For a detailed explanation of the relevant disclosure thresholds, as 
well as explanations and references to the relevant provisions of law, see Centre for 
Business Research, supra note 173. 
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To further gauge whether activist hedge funds build up smaller entry 
stakes in countries with more stringent ownership disclosure thresholds, 
Table 3 computes a one–way ANOVA test.181  The average entry 
ownership stake of activist hedge funds is 2.9, 6.9, 7.3, and 9 percent in 
countries with 2, 3, 5, and 10 percent initial notification thresholds, 
respectively.  The difference in the average entry ownership stakes is 
statistically significant for the natural logarithm of ENTRYOWNER at the 1 
percent level.182 
 
TABLE 3: OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE RULES’ EFFECT ON ACTIVIST 
OWNERSHIP STAKES 
Columns 1 to 4 of this Table present the sample size and the average entry 
ownership stake of activist hedge funds when the triggering ownership threshold is 
2, 3, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  Column 5 presents the sample size and the 
average entry ownership stake of activist hedge funds when there are no ownership 
disclosure obligations.  The ownership disclosure measure (OWNERDISCL) equals 
1 if shareholders who acquire at least 2 percent of the companies’ capital have to 
disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 3 percent of the capital; equals 0.5 if this 
concerns 5 percent; equals 0.25 if this concerns 10 percent; and equals 0 when 
there is no disclosure obligation.183  To construct OWNERDISCL, I take into 
account the threshold percentage of disclosure at the first year of investment for 
each activist campaign.  I assign one score for each of the 494 hedge fund–target 
pairs.  Column 3 presents the one–way ANOVA test.  The dependent variable 
(ENTRYOWNER), which represents the ownership that activist hedge funds build 
up when they begin investing in their target companies, does not meet the 
 
 181.  I use one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) because I have one categorical 
independent variable (OWNERDISCL) and one continuous dependent variable 
(ENTRYOWNER).  The one-way analysis of variance is used to test the claim that three or 
more population means are equal.  This is an extension of the two independent sample t-
tests.  For definitions of the variables, see Table 4. 
 182.  However, the one-way ANOVA test does not test that one mean is less than 
another, only whether they are equal or at least one is different.  This is why future empirical 
research needs to test whether this difference really exists, and if yes, whether it is 
attributable to other factors—although there might be some evidence to support the claim 
that there is a difference in the mean of activist ownership stakes across the five disclosure 
regimes. 
 183.  This definition is preferable to the one used in the CBR shareholder protection 
index (Variable 10), as it accounts for differences between countries with a 2% and a 3% 
ownership threshold.  See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.  For a detailed 
analysis of the evolution of ownership disclosure between 1995 and 2005 based on Variable 
10 of the CBR index, see M.C. Schouten & M.M. Siems, The Evolution of Ownership 
Disclosure Rules Across Countries, 10 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 451 (2010) (analyzing the 
development of ownership disclosure between 1995 and 2005). 
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normality assumption.  This is why I compute the one–way ANOVA test with the 
dependent variable being the natural logarithm of ENTRYOWNER. 
 
 
 
 
As for the maximum ownership stakes of the 494 hedge fund–target 
pairs studied, in only 10 does the insurgent surpass the corresponding 
mandatory bid thresholds, while in the 95th percentile, activist hedge funds 
hold 28.76 percent of the target company.  Even more interestingly, 
different patterns arise across countries depending on the actual thresholds 
that trigger a mandatory bid.184  For instance, in the United Kingdom, 
where the mandatory bid threshold is 30 percent, there are 24 activist 
maximum ownership positions between 25 and 29.99 percent.  Even when 
activist hedge funds form wolf–packs, they rarely find themselves subject 
to an obligation to make a general offer.185  In Canada, however, where the 
mandatory bid threshold is 20 percent, the activist hedge funds studied tend 
to acquire stakes below 20 percent, which are evidently smaller than their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom.  Surprisingly, perhaps, activist hedge 
funds in the Netherlands, where there is no mandatory bid threshold, never 
surpass 30 percent, while there is only one activist hedge fund 
accumulating an ownership stake of more than 20 percent in a Dutch 
company.  These findings should be read in light of the activist hedge 
funds’ general aversion to acquiring corporate control.186  From the 883 
activist hedge fund strategies studied, only 37 involve takeover bids,187 
 
 184.  See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (describing when an acquirer must 
make a tender offer to all shareholders (mandatory bid rule) and the frequency of such an 
occurrence). 
 185.  In my sample, none of the two wolf-packs targeting U.K. companies triggered the 
mandatory bid rule, despite the participating activist hedge funds together carrying more 
than 30% of the company’s voting rights.  (Data on file with the author). 
 186.  See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 58–60 (distinguishing between the 
market for corporate control and the market for corporate influence, and suggesting that 
activist hedge funds are associated with the latter). 
 187.  See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 497 (explaining characteristics of hedge fund 
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while empirical evidence on hedge fund activism in the United States—
where the would–be–acquirers can bid as small or as large of a percentage 
of the target company as they wish188—shows that even in the absence of a 
mandatory bid rule, activist hedge funds rarely attempt to take over the 
targeted company.189 
In addition to ownership disclosure rules, we have seen that tight rules 
on acting–in–concert may introduce an additional barrier to the trading 
stage of an activist campaign.190  Data on how often activist hedge funds 
have avoided being treated as a “group” for purposes of disclosure 
regulations are very difficult to obtain.  In the United States, Thomas 
Briggs collected data on hedge fund activism during a 20–month period 
and reported that thirteen out of the 52 campaigns he studied involved some 
kind of pack activity.191  In their clinical study on activist engagement by 
the Hermes Focus Fund, Professors Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin 
Mayer, and Stefano Rossi also provide some data about behind the scenes 
shareholder collaboration.192  The sample studied here provides a window 
through which to examine the impact of acting–in–concert legislation in a 
wide range of countries.  From the total 432 activist campaigns studied, 50 
appear to involve a form of wolf–pack, while four campaigns involve two 
different wolf–packs formed from different activist hedge funds and/or 
different time periods.  From the total 54 wolf–packs, only 6 have been 
caught by acting–in–concert legislation and subjected to filing 
requirements, while the other 48 involve activist funds mutually supportive 
but separate filers or other coalitions reported in the press.193 
 
activism based on empirical evidence). 
 188.  The 1986 Williams Act—the main federal law governing public takeover bids (or 
tender offers)—does not impose a mandatory bid rule.  Pennsylvania, Maine, and South 
Dakota, however, have “control share cash-out” laws triggered at 20%, 25% and 50%, 
respectively.  See Klaus J. Hopt, European Takeover Reform of 2012/2013—Time to Re-
Examine the Mandatory Bid, 15 EUR. BUS. ORG. REV. 143, 168 (2014). 
 189.  See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1743 (summarizing the occurrence of 
different hedge fund tactic categories). 
 190.  See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing when activist hedge 
funds team up with other hedge funds and the benefits of these arrangements for the hedge 
funds involved). 
 191.  Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An 
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. LAW 681, 698 (2007). 
 192.  Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical 
Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093 (2009). 
 193.  Data on file with the author. 
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C. The Disciplining Stage 
After accumulating a sizeable stake, the insurgent(s) announces a 
change in the firm’s policy it believes as value–enhancing and then tries to 
get that change carried out (disciplining stage).  The overarching goal of 
activist hedge funds is superior risk–adjusted returns.  In the course of their 
campaigns, however, they state a variety of objectives, which can be sorted 
into three broad groups:  corporate governance activism, corporate 
management activism, and corporate control activism.  I use the term 
corporate management activism to describe activist campaigns with the aim 
of determining capital, operational, and strategic changes that are necessary 
for improving firm performance.  Corporate governance activism includes 
activist events launched in the name of corporate governance best practices 
on matters including board independence, executive compensation, and 
anti–takeover defenses.  Lastly, corporate control activism encompasses 
not only attempts to direct the affairs of the target firm replacing the 
majority of the board members, but also attempts to facilitate control 
transactions, such as mergers and sales of the company to third parties and 
interventions where the activist makes an offer to buy the target. 
Data that I have compiled on the stated objectives of activist hedge 
fund campaigns provide a helpful way of examining whether hedge fund 
activism operates similarly across different countries.194  Table 4 (Panel A) 
breaks down the activist objectives in the three broad categories of activism 
(corporate governance, corporate management, and corporate control) by 
target country.  Overall, the review of the stated objectives suggests that in 
my sample countries, as in the United States, activist hedge funds engage 
with incumbent management intent on bringing about changes in corporate 
strategy and financial structure to enhance returns to shareholders; in 
almost 41.2 percent of the stated objectives, hedge funds tried to force a 
capital–related or an operational change (corporate management activism).  
This should not be striking if we take into account that maximization of 
shareholder value is paramount for activist hedge funds.  Corporate 
governance activism is also quite popular, making up 30.1 percent of the 
activist objectives, while engagement in transfers of control is the activist 
hedge funds’ stated objective in 28.7 percent of the total sample.  The 
prominence of corporate management activism is evident in most of the 
countries studied, with the exception of Canada where the majority of the 
activist objectives (36.1 percent) relate to corporate control activism.195  
 
 194.  Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 491–95. 
 195.  The relatively high frequency of corporate control activism in Canada is probably 
due to the fact that U.S. hedge funds launch U.S.-style proxy fights in Canadian companies.  
For an account of hedge fund activism targeting Canadian companies, see Brian R. Cheffins, 
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Also, in France, Australia, and Switzerland, most of the activist objectives 
relate to corporate governance changes.196 
To test whether these cross–country differences in the activists’ stated 
objectives are attributed to cross–country differences in the protection of 
shareholder rights, Table 4 (Panel B) groups the countries by their 
shareholder protection regime in High SP and Low SP countries.197  
Evidently, there is a common pattern across the two groups:  activist hedge 
funds engage more often in corporate management activism.  From the 741 
stated objectives of the activist campaigns targeting companies located in 
High SP regimes, 41.7 percent fall within the corporate management camp, 
while corporate governance and corporate control objectives amount to 
30.5 and 27.8 percent, respectively.  The proportion of corporate 
management activism is slightly lower in Low SP countries (39.5 percent), 
while activist hedge funds engage more often with corporate control 
transactions in Low SP countries (30.8 percent).  The chi–square test 
suggests, however, that there is no statistically significant association 
between the shareholder protection regime and the stated objective.  That 
is, the activist stated objectives are not attributable to differences in the 
shareholder protection regime. 
 
TABLE 4: ACTIVIST OBJECTIVES AND SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
RULES 
Panel A reports the summary of activist hedge funds’ stated objectives by 
country.  The sample includes 946 stated objectives across 432 activist campaigns.  
The difference in numbers is due to the fact that in each hedge fund–target pair the 
hedge fund can have multiple objectives.  Panel B reports key statistics for the 
dependent variable, OBJECTIVE, by shareholder protection regime.  OBJECTIVE 
is a categorical variable, which equals 1 if the stated objective of hedge fund 
activism is directed to improvements of corporate management (corporate 
management activism); equals 2 if the stated objective of hedge fund activism is 
directed to improvements of corporate governance (corporate governance 
activism); and equals 3 if the stated objective of hedge fund activism is directed to 
 
Hedge Fund Activism Canadian Style 47 U. B.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the role of 
hedge fund activism in Canadian corporate governance). 
 196.  The relatively high frequency of corporate governance activism in Australia, 
France, and Switzerland is likely due to the relatively high number of activist campaigns 
seeking minority board representation and ousting of key executives without acquiring 
control of the company (9, 16, and 8, respectively).  Further on this category of activism, see 
Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 492, 494–95 (classifying the corporate governance-related 
stated objectives of activist hedge funds into nine sub-categories). 
 197.  Countries with less than five-stated activist objectives are omitted (i.e., Spain, 
Turkey, Brazil, India, and Malaysia). 
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changes in corporate control (corporate control activism).  Countries with a value 
of SP that is greater than the median value of SP for each sample are classified as 
High SP regimes, while those with a value of SP that is less or equal to the median 
of SP for each sample are classified as Low SP regimes.  N is total number of the 
variables of interest observed in each shareholder protection regime.  Countries 
with less than 5 stated objectives are omitted.  Panel B also reports chi–square test 
statistics for the dependent variable, OBJECTIVE. 
 
 
Panel A: Activist Hedge Funds' Stated Objectives by Country 
 Corporate 
Management 
Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate 
Control 
 N % N % N % 
All Countries 390 41.23% 285 30.13% 271 28.65% 
UK 122 44.53% 76 27.74% 76 27.74% 
Japan 112 51.38% 54 24.77% 52 23.85% 
Canada 47 32.64% 45 31.25% 52 36.11% 
Germany 27 40.30% 13 19.40% 27 40.30% 
France 14 25.93% 24 44.44% 16 29.63% 
Netherlands 20 45.45% 9 20.45% 15 34.09% 
Australia 8 25.00% 14 43.75% 10 31.25% 
Switzerland 10 35.71% 12 42.86% 6 21.43% 
Italy 8 40.00% 8 40.00% 4 20.00% 
Russia 6 31.58% 13 68.42%   
South Africa 4 21.05% 11 57.89% 4 21.05% 
Sweden 8 47.06% 5 29.41% 4 23.53% 
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Panel B: OBJECTIVE by Shareholder Protection (SP) 
 High SP Low SP   
 N % N %   
OBJECTIVE (=1) 309 41.70% 77 39.50%   
OBJECTIVE (=2) 226 30.50% 58 29.70%   
OBJECTIVE (=3) 206 27.80% 60 30.80%   
Chi–square test (Low 
SP vs. High SP) 
0.691      
 
Activist hedge funds use a range of strategies to pursue their stated 
objectives, founded upon the ownership of a sizeable, though non–
controlling, stake.  In a previous study, I presented evidence on activist 
hedge fund strategies across 17 countries between 2000 and 2010.198  The 
883 activist strategies studied had an escalating degree of hostility against 
the target company, from meetings and letter writings (gentle activism), to 
public criticism and shareholder resolutions or board representation without 
publicly-reported management confrontation (soft activism), to efforts to 
replace the board or to take control of the company (aggressive activism).199 
Since I have examined 432 activist campaigns, but 883 activist 
strategies, from which 270 are assigned as aggressive activism, it is useful 
to investigate the aggressiveness of each activist campaign.  Table 5 (Panel 
A) provides evidence on the aggression of global activist hedge fund’s 
campaigns and confirms that activist hedge funds are not mainly 
aggressive, as the majority of activist campaigns involve only gentle and/or 
soft tactics (237 out of 432 activist campaigns).  Panel A also reports that 
there is considerable congruence between the activist strategies, with solely 
aggressive campaigns being the minority across all the sample countries.  
However, in several aspects in terms of coverage and emphasis there are 
some cross–country differences.  For instance, the overwhelming majority 
of activist campaigns in Japan (74.76 percent) involve only gentle and/or 
soft tactics, while the corresponding percentage is 72.7 and 53.1 percent in 
Italy and the United Kingdom, respectively.  On the other hand, more 
aggressive tactics are adopted in Switzerland, France, and Germany, where 
 
 198.  Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 484. 
 199.  Id. at 485–86. 
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the overwhelming majority of activist campaigns involve at least one 
aggressive tactic (80, 68, and 63.3 percent, respectively). 
Panel B of Table 5 groups the countries by shareholder protection in 
High SP regimes and Low SP regimes.200  The aggressiveness of the activist 
hedge funds’ campaigns is measured in two categories (0: gentle/soft, 1: 
aggressive).  Evidently, there is a common pattern across the two groups:  
activist hedge funds mainly use gentle/soft approaches.  The proportion of 
gentle and/or soft strategies in High SP and Low SP regimes amounts to 
53.1 and 55.3 percent, respectively.  Although there is a small difference in 
favor of the Low SP countries, the chi–square test shows that this difference 
is not statistically significant. 
 
TABLE 5: ACTIVIST STRATEGIES AND SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
RULES 
Panel A reports the aggressiveness of each activist campaign in my sample by 
country.  The sample includes 883 activist strategies across 432 activist campaigns.  
In order to examine the aggressiveness of each activist campaign, I split the activist 
campaigns into two groups:  those that include only gentle and soft tactics and 
those that include at least one aggressive tactic.  I track the evolution of each 
campaign using information from press reports.  Panel B reports key statistics for 
the dependent variable, AGGRESSION, by shareholder protection regime.  
AGGRESSION is a dummy variable, which equals “0” if the activist hedge fund 
employs only gentle/soft tactics and equals “1” if the activist employs mixed (both 
gentle/soft and aggressive) or solely aggressive tactics.  Countries with a value of 
shareholder protection, or “SP”, that is greater than the median of value of SP for 
each sample are classified as High SP regimes, while those with a value of SP that 
is less than or equal to the median of SP for each sample are classified as Low SP 
regimes.  “N” is the total number of the interest variables observed in each 
shareholder protection regime.  Panel B also reports the chi–square test statistics 
for the dependent variable, AGGRESSION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200.  Countries with less than five activist campaigns are omitted (i.e., Brazil, India, 
Malaysia, Spain and Turkey). 
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Panel A: Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns by Aggression 
  
Gentle/Soft 
 
Aggressive 
 N % N % 
All Countries 237 54.86% 195 45.14% 
UK 68 53.13% 60 46.88% 
Japan 77 74.76% 26 25.24% 
Canada 28 47.46% 31 52.54% 
Germany 11 36.67% 19 63.33% 
France 8 32.00% 17 68.00% 
Netherlands 11 55.00% 9 45.00% 
Australia 8 42.11% 11 57.89% 
Italy 8 72.73% 3 27.27% 
Switzerland 2 20.00% 8 80.00% 
South Africa 6 75.00% 2 25.00% 
Sweden 4 66.67% 2 33.33% 
Russia 1 20.00% 4 80.00% 
     
 
Panel B: AGGRESSION by Shareholder Protection (SP) 
  
High SP 
 
Low SP 
 N % N % 
AGGRESSION (=0) 180 53.10% 47 55.30% 
AGGRESSION (=1) 159 46.90% 38 44.70% 
Chi–square test (Low SP vs. 
High SP) 
0.132    
 
D.    Summary of Empirical Findings 
Drawing together the preliminary empirical findings presented in this 
Part, one can arrive at a precursory conclusion:  the extent to which law 
matters depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached.  Ceteris 
paribus, the number of activist hedge fund campaigns is larger in countries 
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with stronger mandatory disclosure and shareholder protection regimes 
(entry stage).  Of these two legal variables, however, shareholder protection 
has a more significant effect on the incidence of worldwide hedge fund 
activism. 
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, activist hedge funds 
acquire smaller entry ownership stakes in countries with lower initial 
disclosure thresholds.  The empirical data studied also reveal that other 
parameters of the ownership disclosure rules—such as the acting–in–
concert legislation and the mandatory bid rule—have somewhat weaker 
ramifications for the trading stage of an activist campaign. 
Finally, at the disciplining stage of an activist campaign, shareholder 
protection seems to have little explanatory power, as the activist stated 
objectives and employed strategies are not attributable to differences in the 
shareholder protection regime.  This suggests that while a minimum 
protection of the shareholder rights is a necessary condition for the activist 
hedge funds’ entry to a target company, subsequent choices of the activist 
objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to the ways in 
which the legal regimes affect hedge fund activism.  Because activist hedge 
funds pursue activism as a profit–making strategy, they choose a target 
company and amass a sizeable stake only when the anticipated benefits 
from intervention outweigh the costs associated with the different stages of 
an activist campaign.  Activist hedge funds, therefore, state the objectives 
and resort to the strategies that enable them to make profits from activism 
irrespective of the shareholder rights afforded to them. 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Triggered by the differences in the incidence, magnitude, and nature 
of worldwide hedge fund activism, this Article has provided a theoretical 
and empirical framework for understanding the legal parameters 
underpinning the monitoring role that activist hedge funds can play and 
how effectively they can play it.  On the theoretical side, this Article 
introduces an activist hedge fund campaign as a sequence of four stages:  
entry, trading, disciplining, and exit.  This four–stage framework serves as 
a heuristic device to identify a number of legal factors likely to determine 
the emergence and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism.  On the 
empirical side, this Article expands the empirical base for the study of the 
relationship between law and hedge fund activism in two ways:  first, it 
tracks the emergence of worldwide hedge fund activism on the basis of a 
hand-collected dataset on activist hedge fund campaigns between 2000 and 
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2010 across 25 countries; and second, it draws upon legal indices provided 
by the law and finance scholarship and leximetric coding techniques to 
capture whether law is facilitative of hedge fund activism. 
The empirical findings of Part IV show that international differences 
in the scope of mandatory disclosure rules and ownership disclosure rules 
are among the factors that shape the entry and trading stage of activist 
hedge fund campaigns across countries, respectively.  More importantly, 
the ability of activist hedge funds to engage with directors of companies on 
issues concerning the corporate governance or the performance of the target 
company is largely dependent on the law protecting shareholder rights—
meaning, in this context, legal rules governing the scope that activist hedge 
funds have to utilize the shareholder decision–making procedures to affect 
changes in corporate policy and governance, to exercise a veto over board 
initiatives, to appoint and remove directors, and to bring litigation.  I find 
that the frequency of activist hedge fund campaigns increases with the 
extent to which the rights of shareholders are protected from managerial 
discretion.  However, the data with respect to the disciplining stage of 
activist hedge fund campaigns provide little support that the activist 
objectives and the employed strategies are a reflection of the shareholder 
protection regime of the country in which the target company is located.  
Though it may appear paradoxical, the preliminary findings of this study 
suggest that while a minimum protection of the shareholder rights is a 
necessary condition for the activist hedge funds’ entry, subsequent choices 
of the activist objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to 
the ways in which the legal regimes affect hedge fund activism. 
Worldwide hedge fund activism, however, is not a mere reflex of the 
legal parameters studied in this Article.  One may adduce extra–legal 
factors explaining the differences in the incidence, nature, and outcomes of 
hedge fund activism across countries.  Such factors include, but are not 
limited to, the performance, size, and ownership structure of the target 
company, as well as the nature of the influential activities and domicile of 
the insurgent.  Future research will aim to test the impact of those 
additional factors on the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign 
by multivariate empirical means.  It is important to consider empirical data 
from a multitude of countries—both before and after the 2008 financial 
crisis—to understand why the incidence and magnitude of hedge fund 
activism differs around the world and whether hedge fund activism will be 
a permanent feature of corporate governance.  Although further empirical 
research is required to shed light on the complex interplay between hedge 
fund activism and law, this study reinforces, rather than undercuts, the 
perception that law matters to worldwide hedge fund activism, mostly by 
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vindicating shareholder rights as a determinant of the differences in the 
incidence and prevalence of hedge fund activism across the world. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 HEDGE FUND TARGET PAIRS BY HEDGE FUND AND GEOGRAPHY 
 
The table in this appendix reports the frequency distribution of hedge 
funds–target pairs by hedge fund and geography in the hand–collected 
dataset between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010.  Only the hedge 
funds with three or more engagements are listed.  It should be noted that 
the hedge funds involved in wolf–packs get credited individually.  My 
sample includes 432 activist campaigns, but 494 hedge fund–target pairs.201 
 
 
 201.  For the abbreviations, see supra Figure 2.  The following abbreviations are also 
used: MC (Monaco), SG (Singapore), and VG (Virgin Islands). 
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